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Preface

The maintenance of financial stability by the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) primarily concerns the safeguard of conditions which ensure the proper and efficient functioning of the financial system and consequently, the promotion of real economic activity. The financial system consists directly of three basic financial components: institutions, markets and infrastructure. These components interact with each other as well as with other indirect participants in the system – such as households, nonfinancial corporations and the public sector – to allocate economic resources and redistribute financial risks.

Aside from the supervision of banks, the BOJ is charged with the responsibility of ensuring that the overall financial system is robust to shocks and that participants are assured of its robustness. This entails making sure that financial institutions, in particular banks, are sound. The maintenance of financial stability by the Bank also involves overseeing the efficient and smooth determination of asset prices, making certain that participants honour promises to settle market transactions and preventing the emergence of systemic settlement risk arising from various financial imbalances that may develop within individual institutions or the system.

The Financial Stability Report 2011 provides an assessment of the main financial developments, trends and vulnerabilities influencing the stability of Jamaica’s financial system during the year. The Report covers:

i) an overall assessment of financial stability;
ii) macro-financial risks;
iii) financial system developments
iv) financial system sectoral exposures;
v) risk assessment of the financial system; and
vi) payment system developments

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1 Financial institutions include inter alia banks, securities firms, insurance companies, unit trusts, mutual funds and pension funds. Financial markets include inter alia foreign exchange, money and capital markets. Financial infrastructure refers to payment and settlement systems.
1. Financial Stability Overview

Macro-financial Environment
The Bank of Jamaica (BoJ) continued to assess the financial system during 2011 to identify any potential threats to financial stability. The financial health of the corporate, household and government sectors as well as structural developments were also closely observed to detect, in a timely manner, possible signs of stress that may negatively affect the financial system. Overall, financial stability risks deteriorated slightly in 2011 despite improved economic activity and slightly enhanced credit quality for households relative to credit conditions that prevailed in 2010.

The general financial stability environment in 2011, although remaining stable, was dominated by higher credit risks (see Chapter 4). The credit risk conditions permeating the financial markets in 2011 were affected by domestic economic conditions pertaining to uncertainty surrounding the status of the Stand-By Arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), deteriorating debt indicators, the delay of other key economic reforms and the less than favourable strength of economic recovery.

The annual change in Jamaica’s gross domestic product (GDP) returned to positive growth rates at end-2011. In addition, economic activity appeared to be trending to levels recorded prior to the international financial crisis that started in 2007. Despite this, there was significant growth in non-performing loans (NPLs). This raised no significant concerns as DTIs had more than adequate loan loss provisioning. Of note, however, this growth in NPLs outpaced the increase in loan loss provisioning by DTIs during 2011.

The evolution of improved economic activity in 2011 was supported by increased borrowing activities in the household and corporate sectors (see Chapter 4). The maintenance of a low interest rate environment during the review period created a positive atmosphere for credit growth, improved loan quality ratios and a reduction in non-performing loans to the household sector. However, there was a high delinquency rate on loans in the corporate sector, which contributed to the strong growth in NPLs for the review period.

Global Environment
International financial market tensions increased during 2011 as a result of rising sovereign debt levels in a number of Euro area member states. As a consequence, a number of sovereign credit rating downgrades contributed to lower market liquidity, higher price volatility in those markets and greater contagion risk across global financial markets. These developments increased the risks to global financial stability and hence policy makers worldwide took various initiatives including fiscal consolidation to mitigate risks.

Sovereign risk pressures were aggravated by signs of slowing global economic growth and increased uncertainty about prospects for the world economy. The weakening in global economic activity may have been attributed to:
- temporary effects from the earthquake and tsunami in Japan;
- a significant rise in commodity prices;
- the heightening of Euro area sovereign risk.

In regard to the United States of America, despite the continuation of loose monetary policy since 2007, the US dollar strengthened in 2011. This occurred in the context of accelerated economic growth as well as a flight to US Treasury bonds primarily from European investors.
Domestic Financial System Developments

In 2011, the characteristics of external and internal macro-financial environment were not homogenous. The positive economic performance of the economy was reflected in improved performance of a number of financial institutions. There were, however, several identified risks to the domestic financial sector in 2011. These risks included:

- a pronounced increase in NPLs, primarily to corporations, which propagated higher levels of credit risk for DTIs;
- the scheduled increases in risk weights on foreign currency Government of Jamaica (GOJ) instruments as a benchmark requirement under the IMF Stand-by Arrangement with Jamaica contributed to a decline in the capital adequacy ratios of financial institutions, in particular securities dealers; and\(^1\)
- protracted uncertainty regarding the status of reviews of the country’s medium-term programme by the IMF led to elevated sovereign risk in the financial system.

Despite these challenges, for the year under review, the financial sector was adequately capitalized.

Notably, the performance in the insurance sector was more favourable over the review period relative to 2010. This performance was due primarily to:

- the introduction of a new regulatory measure for general insurance companies’ capital requirements;\(^2\)
- robust growth in the sector’s asset base driven mainly by increased fixed term investments in GOJ securities; and
- improved profitability resulting from growth in revenues from premiums.

However, performance in the sector was dampened by the muted levels of insurance penetration, indicating the relatively underdeveloped status of that segment of the market.

On balance, risks to financial stability from the insurance sector remained negligible given that the aggregate solvency ratio in this sector was quite robust.

Financial System Exposures

Financial soundness indicators reflected improved performance within the financial sector for 2011. Specifically, financial institutions experienced an overall increase in profitability in 2011 relative to 2010 (see Chapter 3). This increase in profitability was the result of:

- activities in the banking sector which realized accelerated growth in the asset base;
- continued reduction in risks related to the cost of financing in 2011, despite low aggregate demand and unfavourable performance on interest bearing assets; and
- lower market interest rates during 2011, thus generating lower interest expense relative to 2010.

Improved profitability within the sector was dampened by deteriorated efficiency levels brought about primarily by an increase in loans to the household sector.\(^3\) There was also growth in loans to all economic sectors except Manufacturing, a tool for regulators and insurance companies to improve the sector’s capital adequacy.

\(^1\) Risk weightings on GOJ foreign currency denoted securities were introduced in the March 2010 quarter. See Box 1.1 for details.

\(^2\) The introduction of the minimum capital test (MCT) at end-June 2011 replaced the minimum asset test (MAT) with a risk-based risk management tool for regulators and insurance companies to improve the sector’s capital adequacy.

\(^3\) The efficiency ratio is computed as the ratio of operating expenses to net interest income.
Construction, and Professional & Other Services (see Chapter 4).

The financial strength of the non-financial corporate sector showed mixed signals in 2011. In particular, there was an overall reduction in profitability in all sectors, with the exception of Communications and Manufacturing. In contrast, there were improvements in the financial strength of Mining & Quarrying, Electricity and Transport, Storage & Communications reflecting higher credit growth (see Chapter 3). This overall picture was corroborated by the marginal growth in the main JSE Index.4

Risk Assessment of the Financial System

In 2011, systemic risks to the financial system were mitigated by:

• strong levels of capitalization despite a reduction in the CAR of some institutions; and
• adequate liquidity conditions of financial institutions as affirmed by stress test results regarding the capacity of the financial system to absorb potential shocks.

However, concerns about the quality of financial institutions’ credit exposures remained from the previous year. Nevertheless, indications were that financial institutions could withstand hypothetical shocks including possible large declines in average deposits, sharp depreciation in the value of the Jamaica Dollar, an increase in domestic and foreign interest rates and an increase in the stock of NPLs (see Chapter 5).

Payment System Developments

Within the oversight framework, the Bank continued to assess systemic risk related to the operations of the major domestic payment and settlement systems, including the Bank’s real time gross settlement system (RTGS) and Central Securities Depository (CSD), in 2011. The assessment confirmed that:

• the risk to financial stability was persistently low in these systems; and
• payment and settlement systems in Jamaica operated efficiently in a safe environment which posed no threat to its participants and the entire financial system.

During the year, there was a significant reduction in the average volume and value of transactions by cheque. This decline was largely due to the implementation of the ACH value threshold during the review period which augured well for payment system safety.

Outlook

Although credit risk is expected to remain a concern in 2012, the outlook for financial stability is stable. While economic activity has picked up in Jamaica, the financial system remains susceptible to any weakening in the recovery which could give rise to further credit risk. In addition, sovereign risk from the Euro area remains elevated and could pose significant threat to domestic macroeconomic performance.

The improved performance of the household sector is expected to remain at the level experienced during 2011. It is also expected that the repayment capacity of the household sector will be stronger in 2012, contingent on the maintenance of a low interest rate environment. In contrast, corporate sector performance is expected to remain muted during 2012. The main risk to financial stability in 2012 is the protracted uncertainty regarding the status of a new financial programme with the IMF.

4 The JSE index grew by 11.8 per cent in 2011, relative to growth of 2.3 per cent in 2010 (see Chapter 4).
This uncertainty will continue to negatively affect sovereign risk exposure in the financial system.
Box 1.1 Impact of Risk Weights on GOJ Foreign Currency Securities

In 2010, the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) and the Financial Services Commission (FSC) began the phased implementation of the 100.0 per cent risk weighting on all Government of Jamaica (GOJ) foreign currency denominated instruments, consistent with Basel standards. Prior to this, GOJ foreign currency instruments were assigned a zero risk weighting. This move formed part of the structural reform agenda under Jamaica's Stand-by Arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF-SBA) to strengthen the regulatory and supervisory frameworks. The planned implementation involved incremental increases in the regulatory weight of 12.5 percentage points per quarter commencing end-June 2010 with full implementation by March 2012.

The incremental increases in the risk weights over the period end-June 2010 to end-2011 resulted in a trend decline in the respective measures of capital adequacy for all sectors, with the exception of general insurance companies. Notwithstanding the declines, the capital adequacy measures remained above the respective minimum regulatory levels. The CAR for the securities dealers sector was the most impacted throughout the period, declining from 81.5 per cent at end-March 2010 to 29.3 per cent at end-2011 (see Figure 1). This was mainly due to the trend increase in the sector’s risk weighted assets. Similarly, the CAR for the deposit-taking institutions (DTIs) declined throughout the period mainly due to increases in the sector’s risk weighted assets (see Figure 2). The CAR for the sector was 18.6 per cent at end-March 2010 and fell to 15.9 per cent at end-2011. The life insurance sector recorded a decline in its minimum continuing capital and surplus requirements (MCCSR) over the review period (see Figure 3). Notably, the sector’s MCCSR declined from 329.7 per cent at end-March 2010 to 282.0 per cent at end-2011 mainly reflecting a fall in the sector’s total capital available. Prior to end-September 2011, the general insurance companies were monitored using the minimum asset test (MAT) which measures the regulatory capital on a liquidation basis. The MAT for the sector showed a trend increase from 151.4 per cent at end-June 2010 to 538.4 per cent at end-June 2011 (see Figure 4). However, due to the need for a more risk-based capital assessment model for the general insurance companies, the Minimum Capital Test (MCT) has replaced the MAT since end-September 2011. The MCT increased from 288.1 per cent at end-September 2011 to 302.5 per cent at end-2011.

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5 Jamaica - Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies 2010
6 Of note, however, there was a temporary pause in June 2011 which resulted in the risk weights remaining at the end-March 2011 position of 50.0 per cent. This occurred due to implementation challenges mainly for the securities dealers sector. Notwithstanding this temporary break, the phased implementation continued at end-September 2011 with the target of 100.0 per cent risk weighting being adjusted to end-June 2012.

7 The MCT Prescribed Capital Required (“PCR”) assesses the riskiness of assets and policy liabilities and compares capital available to capital required. It is initially set at 200.0 per cent and will be increased to 225.0 per cent in the first quarter of 2012 and increased to 250.0 per cent by 2013.
2. Macro-Financial Risks

2.1 Overview

The conditions in the global financial markets during 2011 reflected investor uncertainty resulting from concerns over the impact of geo-political tensions in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) on oil prices as well as the ability of Euro Area authorities to address a sovereign debt crisis for some European countries. Regarding domestic conditions, there was uncertainty surrounding the status of the Stand-By Arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the strength of economic recovery, deteriorating fiscal and debt indicators as well the delay of key reforms. Notwithstanding these uncertainties, the Jamaican economy returned to positive economic growth as well as recorded relatively low inflation for the review year.

Against the background of these developments the BOJ’s measures of financial stability reflected mixed performance for 2011. Although there was an overall improvement in the macro-financial index in 2011, the micro-prudential indices for all three banking sub-sectors deteriorated. However, the deterioration was contained as only the index for the FIA licensees sector indicated vulnerability. Notwithstanding, there was overall improvement in the Z-score index of insolvency risk for DTIs reflecting a decline in profit volatility. There was also a decline in the exposure of DTIs to GOJ sovereign debt default, as measured by the ratio of holdings of external GOJ debt to capital, during 2011. However, the exposure of DTIs to sovereign default as a measured by credit risk exposure to capital base, increased marginally during the year.

2.2 Macroeconomic Risks in the Domestic and Global Environment

There were positive developments in the Jamaican macro-economy during 2011 reflected in the improved performance of key economic variables such as GDP growth, inflation and the fiscal balance to GDP (see Figure 2.1). In particular, Jamaica recorded the first quarter of growth in March 2011 ending the cycle of 13 consecutive quarters of contraction. The trend continued throughout the remaining quarters of 2011, contributing to growth of 1.3 per cent for the year.

Additionally, the point-to-point headline inflation rate for 2011 fell well within the BOJ’s target range of 6.0 and 8.0 per cent, ending the review period at 6.0 per cent. The outturn was lower than the 11.7 per cent recorded for 2010 and represented the lowest annual inflation rate since 2006. The fiscal balance to GDP ratio also improved relative to 2010 reflecting containment in expenditure given shortfalls in revenues as well as the increase in real GDP during the year.

The broad financial environment, reflected in the Bank of Jamaica’s “cobweb” diagram, indicated that risks to the financial system were fairly stable across different dimensions in 2011 relative to 2010 (see Figure 2.2). Of note, however, there was significant improvement in the ‘domestic environment’ dimension of the cobweb in 2011 relative to 2010. On the contrary, there was a slight deterioration in risks funding and liquidity conditions in 2011. Risks to both the global and domestic economic environment remained generally unchanged over the review period (see Figure 2.2).

Figure 2.1 Selected macroeconomic indicators
The global economy grew by an estimated 3.0 per cent in 2011 relative to a growth rate of 4.1 per cent in 2010 (see Figure 2.3). This expansion occurred despite significant concerns regarding economic spillover effects of an earthquake and tsunami in Japan, the impact of the geopolitical turmoil in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) on world oil prices and the continuation of the Eurozone debt crisis. The impact of these factors was partly offset by accelerated growth in the United States of America.

In addition, investor concerns over the Greek debt restructuring exercise as well as the uncertainty regarding further sovereign risk contagion in the Eurozone resulted in a switching towards safe-haven financial assets during 2011. The increased level of uncertainty in financial markets, particularly during the middle of the year, was reflected in the spike in the Bank of America-Merrill Lynch Financial Stress Index (see Figure 2.4). Further, Credit Default Swap (CDS) prices for selected countries increased relative to end-2010 indicating that investors demanded higher yields on sovereign debt. In particular, there was a significant increase in CDS prices in the third quarter of 2011 for Greece, Mexico, China and Brazil (see Figure 2.5). This followed the intensification of the European debt crisis and reflected the increased risk premium investors demanded for emerging market bonds.
2.3 Domestic Financial Markets

Generally, there was increased volatility in the domestic GOJ bond market in 2011 relative to 2010 (see Figure 2.6). Notably, the longer tenors experienced heightened volatility due mainly to the uncertainty regarding the IMF-SBA and the future prospects of the economy. This uncertainty was also reflected in the higher demand for Government of Jamaica Variable Rate (VR) bonds relative to Fixed Rate (FR) instruments.

During 2011, the spread between the Jamaica Global Bond Index and the Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI+) increased (see Figure 2.7). The increase in the spread occurred although there was no explicit downgrade to the country’s sovereign debt rating. There was, however, a revised outlook for the economy from stable to negative in October 2011 by Standard and Poor’s ratings agency. This revised outlook was mainly influenced by the possible impact of the European debt crisis, increases in world commodity prices, a worsening growth outlook for developed countries and uncertainty regarding the status of the IMF-SBA as well as the Government’s fiscal accounts.

Notwithstanding the influence of these factors, risk appetite in the domestic money market increased in 2011 relative to 2010 (see Figure 2.8). This occurred in a context where the Bank eased its monetary policy stance by lowering the 30-day CD rate four times during the year by a total of 125 bps to 6.25 per cent.
There were minor improvements in the Risk Appetite Index for the foreign exchange market in 2011 as the index increased to 0.04 from -0.23 in 2010 reflecting higher demand for US dollars (see Figure 2.9). This occurred in a context of the maturity of a GOJ global bond and the refinancing of a Government guaranteed bond issued by the National Road Operating and Construction Company (NROCC). Notably, there was a depreciating trend in the exchange rate during the year when compared to the general appreciating trend which occurred during 2010. Nevertheless, the domestic foreign exchange market exhibited relative stability in 2011 as indicated by the favourable values for the Amihud Index (see Figure 2.10). Additionally, the bid-ask spread declined in 2011, relative to 2010, reflecting a lower cost of executing transactions in the foreign exchange market (see Figure 2.11).

The Jamaica Stock Exchange (JSE) Main Index advanced by 11.3 per cent for 2011 relative to the increase of 2.3 per cent recorded for 2010. This was influenced by declines in interest rates on domestic fixed income securities, relative stability in the foreign exchange market and better than expected earnings for several listed companies.

The values from both the Amihud Index of stock market depth and the JSE Risk Appetite Index supported the increase in the Main JSE index. The Amihud Index recorded a decline to 0.14 at end-2011 relative to 0.25 at end-2010 highlighting the increase in the level of participation by investors (see Figure 2.12). Additionally, the JSE risk appetite measure increased to 0.23 in 2011 from 0.09 in 2010 (see Figure 2.13).
2.4 Macro-financial and Macro-prudential Indices

The Bank’s macro-financial index (MaFI) for DTIs at end-2011 improved relative to end-2010. At end-2011, the index recorded a value of 13.0 points, 22.0 points below the value of the index at end-2010 (see Figure 2.14). The performance was attributed to improvement in economic growth, expansion in private sector credit and relatively stable financial market conditions. In particular, the 12-month GDP growth rate increased to 1.85 per cent at end-2011 following a decline of 0.55 per cent at end-2010. This represented the first 12-month year-on-year growth in GDP since end-September 2007. Additionally, the volatility in interest rates and exchange rates declined to 0.2 standard deviations (σ) and 0.1σ relative to respective 11.1σ and 3.7σ at end-2010 as well as respective tranquil period threshold values of 13.8σ and 55.6σ.

The micro-prudential indices (MiPIs) for the commercial banks, FIA licensees and building societies deteriorated at end-2011 compared to end-2010. However, with the exception of the FIA licensees, the MiPIs for the sector remained within the 1996-1999 financial crisis threshold value of 50.0 points. The MiPI for the commercial banks increased to 30.0 points at end-2011 relative to 24.0 points at end-2010. The deterioration in the MiPI for commercial banks reflected an increase in signals from the ratios of loans to capital, financial institution loans to total loans as well as interest income to assets. Offsetting the impact of this deterioration were reductions in the signals from the ratio of deposits to loans, loans and security loss provisions to assets and net income to assets (see Figure 2.15).

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1 The BOJ macro-financial and micro-prudential indices of the banking sector are monitored via a non-parametric approach to signal banking sector vulnerability. The signal is based on scores for each indicator, which is computed based on the number of standard deviations of each indicator from its ‘tranquil period’ mean value. The tranquil period refers to an eight quarter period of relative stability that precedes the beginning of a signaling window. The scores range from 0 to 5 with a score of 5 representing the most severe signal. Banking sector vulnerability at a point in time is determined by the trend in the aggregate score (or index) over the previous eight quarters (signaling window).
For the building societies sector, the MiPI increased to 44.0 points at end-2011 relative to the 32.0 points recorded at the end of the previous year. This deterioration reflected an increase in the signals from the ratios of loans to capital, deposits to total assets, deposits and repos to assets, investment to assets and investment income to assets. In particular, the signals from the ratios of deposits to total assets, deposits and securities sold under repurchase agreements to assets and investment income to assets rose to a signal of 5.0 relative to 0.0 for the previous year (see Figure 2.16).

The MiPI for the FIA licensees increased in severity to 59.0 points as at end-2011, in comparison to the 32.0 points recorded at end-2010. The sharp deterioration in the index was mainly due to an increase in signals from the ratio of loans to capital, deposits to total assets, deposits to total loans, interest income to assets, net income to assets as well as FX liabilities to FX assets (see Figure 2.17).
2.5 Insolvency Risk of DTIs

The Z-score index of insolvency risk for DTIs reflected an increase of 27.6 points to average 69.28 points at end-2011 relative to end-2010 (see Figure 2.18).\(^2\) This improvement was largely influenced by a decline in the volatility of profits for DTIs. In particular, the Z-score index for the building societies increased by 38.8 points to average 73.3 points for 2011 reflecting improvements in capital and profits.

For 2011, the Z-score index for the commercial banking sector increased by 23.9 points to average 67.8 points (see Figure 2.18). The increase in the index for this sector was mainly attributed to growth in profits in spite of a significant increase in profit volatility.

The Z-score for the FIA licensees increased to an average of 75.2 points at end-2011 from an average of 37.6 points at end-2010. This significant improvement in the index reflected a substantial decrease in the volatility of profits.

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2 The Z-score (insolvency risk) index is used as a measure of a bank’s financial soundness. The ratio is calculated as:

\[ z = \frac{\text{ROA} + C/A}{\text{STDDEV(ROA)}} \]

where ROA is the bank’s return on assets, C/A is its regulatory capital to asset ratio and \( \sigma \text{ROA} \) is its standard deviation of return on assets computed over the sampling period. The Z-score is used to capture the likelihood of a bank’s earnings in a given year becoming low enough to eliminate the bank’s capital base and thus, the likelihood of the bank becoming insolvent. A higher Z-score implies a lower probability of insolvency.

3 The Z-Scores are weighted based on the relative total assets of the sectors.
2.6 Distance to Default for DTIs

The vulnerability of DTIs to the risk of default increased over 2011. Specifically, the distance-to-default for DTIs decreased to 6.9 per cent at end-2011 from 8.5 per cent at end-2010 (see Figure 2.19). The deterioration for DTIs reflected the decline in the market value of assets notwithstanding the marginal decline in the implied volatility of assets.

Similar to the DTIs, the risk of default for the non-bank financial sector increase over 2011. Specifically, the distance to default for the non-bank financial sector declined to 4.3 at end-2011 from 4.9 at end-2010. The decline was reflected in an increase in the implied volatility of assets for the sector as well as a decline in the market value of assets for the sector (see Figure 2.20).

\[ \text{Distance to Default} = \frac{1}{2} \times \text{short-term + long-term liabilities} \]
2.7 Exposure to Sovereign Debt Default Risk of DTIs

The exposure of the banking system to sovereign debt default, as measured by the ratio of holdings of GOJ external debt to capital, declined in 2011. At end-2011, this exposure was approximately 36.5 per cent, 141.8 per cent and 28.8 per cent for commercial banks, FIA licensees and building societies, respectively. These exposures represent declines of 23.6 percentage points, 60.4 percentage points and an increase of 3.6 percentage points for the commercial banks, FIA licensees and building societies, respectively, relative to end-2010 (see Figure 2.21).

The probability of sovereign debt default increased by 12.8 percentage points to 35.9 per cent at end-2011 relative to end-2010. However, the exposure of the banking system to sovereign credit risk, as measured by credit risk exposure (CRE), was mixed at end-2011. Both the FIA licensees and building societies recorded marginal increases as a per cent of capital to 35.7 per cent and 7.3 per cent, respectively, while the commercial banks recorded a marginal decline to 9.2 per cent of capital. This was relative to 32.7 per cent, 4.1 per cent and 9.7 per cent for building societies, FIA licensees and commercial banks, respectively, at end-2010 (see Figure 2.22).

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5 The probability of default is estimated using a logit-model with data from 36 countries over the period 1986 to 2005. It evaluates the likelihood of a debt-rescheduling event contingent on developments in the macro-economic environment.

6 The credit risk exposure (CRE) is a product of the holding of GOJ external debt by banks, the probability of default (PD) and the loss given default (LGD).
According to BOJ’s estimate of ratings transition probability matrix at end-2011, 30.8 per cent of DTIs migrated to a lower capital adequacy rating, 61.5 per cent remained within their previous rating and 7.7 per cent were upgraded in rating when compared with their rating at the beginning of the review year. This was in comparison to the preceding year-end, where 23.1 per cent of the institutions were downgraded, 53.8 per cent remained unchanged and 23.1 per cent were upgraded.

There are nine possible ratings that can be attributed to any bank at a given point in time as a function of its capital adequacy ratio (CAR). Banks with CARs which are greater than 20.0 per cent are rated SCAP, between 15.0 and 20.0 per cent are rated WCAP, between 10.0 and 15.0 per cent are rated CAP, between 9.0 and 10.0 per cent are rated UNDER, between 8.0 and 9.0 per cent are rated SUNDER, between 7.0 and 8.0 per cent are rated CUNDER, and CARs between 0.0 and 7.0 per cent are rated NFAIL. The transition probability matrix (TPM) for the banking sector is then calculated by evaluating the proportion of banks which have migrated from one rating to another over the period of a year. As is typical with TPMs the largest probabilities lie along the main diagonal indicating no change of rating for the period. Generalized maximum entropy is then used to condition these unconditional probabilities on bank-specific and macro-economic variables.
3. Financial System Development

3.0 Overview

Institutions within the financial sector remained broadly profitable and adequately capitalized in an environment of anemic domestic economic growth and low global demand during 2011. Financial soundness indicators also signaled improved conditions within the financial sector in particular as it relates to return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) for 2011. This increase in profitability of the financial system was led by the banking sector which realized accelerated growth in its asset base. Despite strong net profits, the financial sector’s capital adequacy decreased during 2011 but remained at acceptable levels amidst strong growth in NPLs during the year. Even within a post-Jamaica Debt Exchange (JDX) business environment, the sector observed robust profits while reducing its financial leverage, despite narrowing interest margins.

3.1 The Financial System

A gradual weakening in the depth of financial intermediation in Jamaica continued during 2011, as measured by total financial institutions assets as a share of GDP (see Figure 3.1). The ratio declined to 126.7 per cent at end-2011 relative to 132.9 per cent at end-2010 and 140.8 per cent at end-2009. This decline in the ratio during 2011 was primarily due to growth in the Jamaican economy. Regarding regional performances, the depth of financial intermediation in Trinidad and Tobago strengthened to 132.2 per cent at end-2011 relative to 122.0 per cent at end-2010. Conversely, this indicator declined sharply for Barbados to 1 045.9 per cent at end-2011 relative to 1 180.1 per cent the previous year (see Figure 3.1).

3.2 Deposit Taking Institutions (DTIs)

In 2011, building societies increased their market share of the sector’s total assets at the expense of commercial banks, credit unions and FIA licensees (see Figure 3.2).

Fig. 3.1 Depth of financial intermediation (assets of financial corporations as % of GDP)

Fig. 3.2 Growth in market shares in DTI assets (%; growth between end-2010 and end-2011)

Fig. 3.3 DTI’s aggregate balance sheet as end-2010 and end-2011

1 Deposit taking institutions include commercial banks, building societies and FIA licensees.
However, commercial banks remained the dominant sector despite their share of system assets decreasing marginally to 69.2 per cent in 2011 from 69.6 per cent in 2010.2 FIA licensees recorded a decline in total assets of 12.5 per cent during the review period following a contraction of 26.1 per cent in 2010. The decline in the FIA licensees’ assets reflected the continued impact of the sub-sector’s re-alignment of its business model with predominant investments in foreign securities (see Figure 3.3).

3.2.1 DTIs balance sheet position

The banking sector’s total assets grew by 4.3 per cent to $868.2 billion during 2011 relative to 2.5 per cent growth during the previous year and an average annual expansion rate of 15.0 per cent for the five years prior to the 2008 global financial crisis. The acceleration in asset growth for the review year mainly reflected an improvement in institutions holdings of Liquid Funds (4.5 per cent) and Other Assets (11.3 per cent), the impact of which was partially offset by a notable decline in Investments (6.7 per cent) while Loans and Advances remained virtually flat (see Figure 3.4). The maximum value for domestic investments as a share of total assets across all DTIs during 2011 declined to 13.3 per cent relative to 14.9 per cent in 2010. This decrease mainly reflected reduction in the holdings of public sector securities. While there was a slight increase in the distribution of loans to total assets across all DTIs in 2011, there was a marginal decline in the median ratio to 7.3 per cent from 7.6 per cent the previous year. Notwithstanding, Loans, Advances and Discounts comprised the majority of DTIs’ asset base, totaling 46.2 per cent at-end 2011, relatively unchanged compared to end-2010.

Lending to domestic households represented the banking sector’s largest exposure to the private sector during 2011 reflecting a 1.0 per cent increase to 24.2

2 Assets are defined as total balance sheet assets
per cent at end-2011 (see Table 2.0). Moreover, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which measures concentration in private sector lending, increased by 8.5 per cent to 2 618.8 (see Figure 3.5). In addition to households, the DTIs’ other significant exposures were to Tourism (8.8 per cent), Construction (7.0 per cent), Professional & Other Services (5.6 per cent) and Overseas Residents (5.6 per cent) at end-2011 (see Table 1.0).

Growth in NPLs accelerated during 2011 relative to the previous year (see Figure 3.6). This resulted in the volume of provisions for NPLs increasing at a faster rate than that which was obtained in 2010. Loan loss provisions grew by 36.4 per cent during 2011 relative to growth of 25.0 per cent during 2010 (see Figure 3.7). Consequently, the NPL coverage ratio improved during 2011 to 69.7 per cent from 67.3 per cent in 2010 and remained well above the requirements under the international accounting standards. This increase was characteristic of the performance of all sub-sectors and the distribution of the ratio for the DTIs revealed an increase in the median aggregate ratio relative to end-2010 (see Figure 3.8).

DTIs also maintained adequate levels of liquidity during 2011. However, the ratio of liquid assets to total assets declined to 23.1 per cent at end-2011 from 26.0 per cent the previous year. This decrease in the ratio was due mainly to significant reductions in holdings of public sector securities that mature in the short term and cash (see Figure 3.9).

On the other hand, total liabilities increased significantly, driven primarily by increased client deposits. These deposits, which accounted for 80.1 per cent of total liabilities at end-2011 relative to 77.9 per cent at end-2010, continued to represent the main source of asset financing (see Figure 3.10). In particular, client deposits as a share of client loans increased to 144.1 per cent at end-2011 from 143.0 per cent at end-2010. This suggests a reduction in risks to

\begin{table}[h]
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\begin{tabular}{|l|l|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Indicator (%)} & \textbf{Indicates} & \textbf{Dec-10} & \textbf{Mar-11} & \textbf{Jun-11} & \textbf{Sep-11} & \textbf{Dec-11} \\
\hline
\textbf{Capital to assets} & Capital adequacy & 15.3 & 15.8 & 15.9 & 16.9 & 16.8 \\
\textbf{Trading income to total income} & Earnings & Profitability & 51.9 & 51.4 & 56.4 & 85.1 & 67.1 \\
\textbf{Personnel expenses to non-interest expenses} & Earnings & Profitability & 40.3 & 38.6 & 42.7 & 39.9 & 38.0 \\
\textbf{Spread between lending & deposits rates} & Earnings & Profitability & 15.0 & 15.6 & 15.5 & 14.0 & 13.8 \\
\textbf{Customer deposits to total (non-interbank) loans} & Liquidity & 18.3 & 21.8 & 25.4 & 25.2 & 28.4 \\
\textbf{Foreign-currency-denominated loans to total loans} & Foreign Exchange risk & 32.0 & 32.0 & 29.8 & 30.0 & 29.9 \\
\textbf{Foreign-currency-denominated liabilities to total liabilities} & Foreign Exchange risk & 36.1 & 36.7 & 37.0 & 36.3 & 36.9 \\
\textbf{Net open position in equities to capital} & Foreign Exchange risk & 17.4 & 16.8 & 16.6 & 15.0 & 15.8 \\
\textbf{Household debt to GDP} & Household sector leverage & 57.8 & 58.3 & 60.2 & 59.7 & 59.3 \\
\textbf{Residential real estate loans to total loans} & Exposure to real estate & 25.0 & 25.2 & 25.0 & 25.1 & 24.6 \\
\textbf{Commercial real estate loans to total loans} & Exposure to real estate & 0.5 & 0.5 & 0.5 & 0.5 & 0.5 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{The Encouraged Set of Financial Soundness Indicators}
\end{table}

Notes:
- 1/ Deposit-taking Institutions (DTIs) includes, commercial banks FIA licensees and building societies
- 2/ Weighted by assets size to get the interest rate spread for the system
- 3/ Represents household debt held by DTIs
- 4/ Represent data for DTIs only
- 5/ Represents data for building societies

\textsuperscript{3} This measures a bank’s ability to absorb potential losses from its non-performing loans. It is calculated as provision for impairment under the IFRS plus prudential provisions for expected losses based on regulatory criteria.
financial stability over the review period as client deposits represent a relatively cheap and stable source of financing (see Figures 3.11 and 3.12).

### 3.2.2 Earnings and profitability

DTIs continued to record strong growth in profits in 2011 partially driven by continued reduction in risk related to the cost of financing. This was despite low aggregate demand and poor performance on interest bearing assets (see Figure 3.12).

At end-2011, the DTIs recorded net profits of $31.1 billion reflecting an increase of 46.8 per cent over that which obtained at end-2010. This corresponded with a return on equity (ROE) of 17.0 per cent at end-2011 relative to 17.5 per cent at end-2010 (see Figure 3.13 and Table 3.0). The reduction in the ROE was mainly due to declines in leverage and risk-adjusted income during the review period.\(^4\) However, DTI return on assets (ROA) increased to 1.7 per cent for 2011 compared to 1.4 per cent for 2010 (see Figure 3.14).

The median leverage ratio of the banking sector marginally declined during 2011 relative to the previous year continuing a trend observed over the past decade (see Figure 3.15).\(^5\) Moreover, the distribution of the ratios of DTIs narrowed significantly since end-2006. The median value declined to 11.7 at end-2011 from 12.4 at end-2010.

While the economic climate remained fragile, even with the economy returning to positive growth during the year, low market interest rates during 2011 significantly contributed to the improved profitability of DTIs. Consequent on the gradual decline in interest expenses due to lower interest rates on deposits and interbank borrowing (to a lesser extent), DTIs’ leverage

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\(^4\) See 2006 Bank of Jamaica Financial Stability Report for more elaborate discussion of the decomposition of ROE.

\(^5\) Leverage ratio is defined as the ratio of Tier 1 Capital to adjusted assets. Adjusted assets are defined as the difference between total assets and intangible assets.
marginally increased during the review period relative to 2010. Nevertheless, DTIs’ financial operations continued to perform creditably during the year. Furthermore, the outturn in net interest margin for DTIs revealed that interest income marginally increased throughout 2011 primarily as a result of a higher interest margin in the retail segment of client deposits and loans which grew faster than the net interest income from the administration of securities and other financial operations (see Figure 3.16). In general, net interest income for DTIs remained largely flat at $50.1 billion in 2011, relative to $50.8 billion in 2010. As such, DTIs profits for 2011 were primarily driven by gains in trading and dividend income of $16.0 billion in the December quarter, relative to $3.0 billion in the corresponding period of 2010.

Of note, interest margin in the retail segment of client deposits and loans grew at a slower pace in the review period relative to 2010. This reduction in the pace of growth resulted in the narrowing of the distribution of the interest margin of the DTIs (see Figure 3.17).

The robust performance in profits during 2011 was not mirrored in DTIs’ capital adequacy as the sector recorded an average CAR of 21.2 per cent at end-2011, down from 22.5 per cent at end-2010. The scheduled increases in risk weights on holdings of GOJ foreign currency denoted securities contributed to the decline in CAR (see Figures 3.18 and 3.19). The quality of regulatory capital, as measured by the ratio of Tier 1 capital to total regulatory capital, was 104.3 per cent at end-2011 relative to 105.5 per cent at end-2010. Retained earnings remained the largest component of Tier 1 capital at end-2011 accounting for 48.4 per cent relative to 46.7 per cent in 2010. Statutory reserves accounted for 28.5 per cent relative to 25.8 per cent at end-2010.
3.2.3 Interbank Market

As the interbank market continued to be actively engaged by most DTIs to manage short-term liquidity demands, the standard measure of connectivity in the interbank market shown by the interrelationship matrix reflected relatively sparse interconnection (see Box 3.1). The average number of relationships between DTIs in Jamaica was around 4.0 at end-2011 (minimum 0, maximum 210) relative to 2.0 at end-2010.6 This suggests a decline in the average connectivity in the banking system which realized an average connectivity of 1.8 per cent relative to 1.3 per cent at end-2011 for the 21 financial institutions assessed (see Figure 3.21).7 Of note, the majority of relationships yielded relatively low exposures (see Figure 3.20). At end-2011, the average net exposure was $438.1 million relative to $818.0 million at end-2010. However, given the presence of low connectivity, its effect is generally limited even in highly adverse scenarios.

3.3 Non-bank Financial Institutions (NBFIs)

NBFIs experienced acceleration in asset growth despite challenging economic conditions during 2011. The sector’s asset base expanded by 2.8 per cent in 2011 relative to 1.2 per cent in 2010. The expansion in the sector’s total assets was largely influenced by increases in total assets of life and general insurance companies by 8.1 per cent and 3.9 per cent, respectively. However, growth of 0.8 per cent in total assets of securities dealers, which accounted for 67.8 per cent of NBFI market share, dammed down growth in the sector’s assets base (see Figure 3.22).

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6 The number of relationships refers to the number of financial institutions that a particular DTI or securities dealer conducts interbank transactions with.

7 However, such figures are very difficult to compare internationally, as they are not generally available for banking sectors and those that are available contain different indicators.
3.3.1 Securities Dealers

The funds under management (FUM) of the major securities dealers increased to $657.6 billion at end-2011 relative to $639.1 billion at end-2010 (see Figure 3.23). The sector’s growth in asset base during 2011 was driven by marginal increases in their holdings of GOJ and BOJ securities, in particular domestic currency holdings. Of note, foreign currency denoted assets declined by 1.76 per cent to $187.9 billion at end-2011 from $191.2 billion at end-2010.

In an environment of scheduled increases in the risk weights on GOJ foreign currency denoted securities, risk weighted assets of the securities dealers grew significantly by 82.7 per cent to $207.2 billion at end-2011 relative to $113.0 billion at end-2010 (see Figure 3.23). Consequently, the sector’s capital adequacy ratio declined to 29.3 per cent at end-2011 relative to 59.2 per cent at end-2010 and 81.5 per cent at end-March 2010 when risk weightings were first implemented on GOJ foreign currency denoted securities (see Figure 3.24). Similarly, the sector’s primary ratio, measured as a ratio of regulatory capital to total assets, decreased to 12.1 per cent at end-2011 relative to 13.5 per cent at end-2010. This was largely due to a decline in regulatory capital by 9.8 per cent to $60.6 billion coupled with a marginal increase in the sector’s total assets during 2011.

However, securities dealers sensitivity to foreign exchange risk declined throughout most of 2011 as the sector’s foreign currency net open position to capital ratio declined to 8.3 per cent at end-2011 relative to 17.5 per cent at end-2010. This reflected the sector’s reduced holdings of foreign currency denoted assets (see Figure 3.25 and Table 4.0).

The sector’s profitability was fairly robust relative to the previous year. Securities dealers profit performance as measured by ROA and ROE recorded values of 2.7 per cent and 19.7 per cent, respectively, at end-2011 relative to respective values of 2.3 per cent and 18.3 per cent at end-2010.

**Box 3.1 The Interbank credit market connectivity effects on Financial Stability**

Interbank markets play an essential role in modern financial systems. In the interbank market, banks with liquidity shortages borrow liquidity from banks with liquidity surpluses. Interbank connectivity in interbank markets, however, creates channels for contagion risks from one institution to the system.

The connectivity for each institution is calculated as the number of relationships with the other institutions relative to the maximum possible number of relationships. However, a risk to the financial system’s stability could arise in a situation where there are several institutions in the sector that are net debtors and have a high number of relationships with other banks. In such a case, especially since interbank exposures are generally unsecured, their collapse could create a domino effect which could destabilize the financial system.

An interbank market can unambiguously stabilize the financial system by reducing overall risk, as liquidity risk can be absorbed by those institutions with liquidity surpluses.

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Similarly, the leverage ratio of the securities dealers increased for 2011 to 15.0 per cent relative to 13.4 per cent at end-2010.\(^9\) This increase was largely due to increases in Tier 1 capital during the review period. However, the ratio of the sector’s holdings of liquid assets to current liabilities decreased to 7.7 per cent for 2011 from 13.7 per cent for the previous year.

### 3.3.2 Insurance Companies

The insurance sector realized robust growth in its asset base during 2011. In particular, life and general insurance companies experienced increases of 8.1 per cent and 3.9 per cent, respectively, in their asset bases. For life insurance companies, this growth was driven predominantly by increases in fixed term investments, in particular expansion in the holdings of GOJ securities of $11.6 billion during 2011. Similarly, increases in GOJ Jamaica Dollar denoted investments were largely responsible for growth in general insurance companies’ asset base during the review year.

Despite the sector’s increased asset base, the insurance penetration continued to be low (see Figure 3.26 and Tables 5.0 & 6.0). Insurance penetration for life insurance companies increased to 2.3 per cent of GDP at end-2011 from 2.1 per cent of GDP at end-2010 while penetration for general insurance companies were

\(^9\) See footnote 5.
flat at 2.2 per cent of GDP at end-2011 relative to end-2010. These developments suggest that the market continued to be relatively underdeveloped as indicated by a 0.001 per cent insurance density (see Box 3.2 and Table 7.0).

During 2011, profitability was robust for insurance companies despite the falloff in interest income since the JDX in 2010. The life insurance sector’s ROA decreased to 13.1 per cent at end-2011 relative to 13.3 per cent at end-2010, while the ROE increased to 61.4 per cent relative to 52.6 per cent at end-2010. However, the general insurance sector realized an increase in both ROA and ROE to 15.2 per cent and 41.0 per cent, respectively, at end-2011 relative to 5.9 per cent and 15.7 per cent respectively, at end-2010. The sector’s improved profitability was largely due to growth in revenues from premiums. For life insurance companies premiums increased by 15.2 per cent at end-2011 relative to 3.4 per cent at end-2010, while premiums for general insurance companies grew by 6.6 per cent at end-2011 relative to 5.8 per cent at end-2010. In addition, both life and general insurance companies registered increases in their holdings of GOJ investment of $11.6 billion and $1.1 billion, respectively, during the review year.

There was introduction of a new regulatory measure for general insurance companies’ capital requirements during 2011. Specifically, the introduction of the minimum capital test (MCT) at end-June 2011 replaced the minimum asset test (MAT). This included a risk-based risk management tool for regulators and insurance companies to improve sector capital adequacy thus strengthening the sector’s financial stability.10

The capital adequacy and solvency of the insurance companies remained at adequate levels at end-2011. In addition, the sector’s ratio of disposable solvency to required solvency though relatively high was comparable to those in major economies (see Figure 3.27).11 The sector was also adequately capitalized despite the ratio of capital to total assets realizing a sharp decline to 21.4 per cent at end-2011 from 31.1 per cent at end-2010 (see Figure 3.28).

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10 The Minimum Capital Test is a measure of capital adequacy for general insurance companies. It is a risk-based minimum requirement determined by applying factors for a number of risk components to specific on- and off-balance sheet assets or liabilities.

11 Measured as the ratio of capital and surplus, investment and capital reserves to total liabilities, this ratio captures the company’s leverage. The higher the ratio, the more the company is able to withstand financial distress and difficult periods.
**Fig 3.21** Debtor and credit: the existence of both positions in DTI and securities dealers (points in the chart are individual institutions as of 31 Dec 2011)

**Fig 3.22** Growth in market share in NBFIs assets (%; growth between end-2010- end-2011)

**Fig 3.23** Securities dealers’ fund under management (FUM) (JMD billions)

**Fig 3.24** Securities dealers’ regulatory capital, capital adequacy and primary ratios (JMD billions; ratios - %)

**Fig. 3.25** Securities dealers’ net open position to capital (%)

**Fig. 3.26** Insurance penetration (% of GDP)
Box 3.2 Brief explanation of Insurance Penetration and Insurance density

Insurance Penetration is defined as the ratio of premium volume to GDP and measures the importance of insurance activity relative to the size of the economy. On the other hand, insurance density is defined as gross premiums per capita expressed. These measures gauge the growth and development potential of the insurance market. Insurance Penetration, however, is not a perfect indicator of insurance consumption since it is a function of quantity and price. Therefore, a higher premium volume might provide misleading representation of insurance penetration. Needless to say, a vibrant insurance sector might also foster the development of the banking sector.

Fig 3.27 Solvency of insurance companies (available to required solvency ratio; %)

Fig 3.28 Capitalization of the insurance sector (JMD billions; %)

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### Table 3.0 Core Set of Financial Soundness Indicators: DTIs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator (%)</th>
<th>Indicates</th>
<th>Dec-10</th>
<th>Mar-11</th>
<th>Jun-11</th>
<th>Sep-11</th>
<th>Dec-11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets</td>
<td>Capital adequacy</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier1 capital to risk-weighted assets</td>
<td>Capital adequacy</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-performing loans (net) to capital</td>
<td>Capital adequacy</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-performing loans to total loans</td>
<td>Assets quality</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return on assets</td>
<td>Earnings &amp; Profitability</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return on equity</td>
<td>Earnings &amp; Profitability</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest margin to income</td>
<td>Earnings &amp; Profitability</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-interest expenses to income</td>
<td>Earnings &amp; Profitability</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquid assets to total assets</td>
<td>Liquidity</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration on assets - Domestic Bonds</td>
<td>Sensitivity to Market Risk</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration on assets - Global Bonds</td>
<td>Sensitivity to Market Risk</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOP to capital</td>
<td>Sensitivity to Market Risk</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
1/ Deposit-taking Institutions includes, commercial banks FIA Licensees and building societies.

### Table 4.0 Core Set of Financial Soundness Indicators: SDs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator (%)</th>
<th>Indicates</th>
<th>Dec-10</th>
<th>Mar-11</th>
<th>Jun-11</th>
<th>Sep-11</th>
<th>Dec-11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets</td>
<td>Capital adequacy</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier1 capital to risk-weighted assets</td>
<td>Capital adequacy</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-performing loans (net) to capital</td>
<td>Capital adequacy</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-performing loans to total loans</td>
<td>Assets quality</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return on assets</td>
<td>Earnings &amp; Profitability</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return on equity</td>
<td>Earnings &amp; Profitability</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest margin to income</td>
<td>Earnings &amp; Profitability</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-interest expenses to income</td>
<td>Earnings &amp; Profitability</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquid assets to total assets</td>
<td>Liquidity</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration on assets - Domestic Bonds</td>
<td>Sensitivity to Market Risk</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration on assets - Global Bonds</td>
<td>Sensitivity to Market Risk</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOP to capital</td>
<td>Sensitivity to Market Risk</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
1/ Includes the top-12 securities dealers.
### Table 5.0 Core Set of Financial Soundness Indicators: General Insurance sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator (%)</th>
<th>Indicates</th>
<th>Dec-10</th>
<th>Mar-11</th>
<th>Jun-11</th>
<th>Sep-11</th>
<th>Dec-11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net premium to Capital</td>
<td>Capital adequacy</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>91.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital to Assets</td>
<td>Capital adequacy</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Real estate + unquoted equities + debtors) to total assets</td>
<td>Assets quality</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>65.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receivables to gross premiums</td>
<td>Assets quality</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equities to total assets</td>
<td>Assets quality</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net technical reserves to net claims paid in last year</td>
<td>Reinsurance &amp; actuarial issues</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>486.2</td>
<td>204.9</td>
<td>124.0</td>
<td>99.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk retention ratio (net premium to gross premium)</td>
<td>Reinsurance &amp; actuarial issues</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross premium to number of employees J$(000)</td>
<td>Management Soundness</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assets per employee J$(000)</td>
<td>Management Soundness</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Claims to net premium (loss ratio)</td>
<td>Earnings &amp; Profitability</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>54.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total expenses to net premium (expense ratio)</td>
<td>Earnings &amp; Profitability</td>
<td>105.1</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>92.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined ratio (loss + expense ratio)</td>
<td>Earnings &amp; Profitability</td>
<td>169.5</td>
<td>151.7</td>
<td>151.9</td>
<td>156.9</td>
<td>147.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment Income to net premium</td>
<td>Earnings &amp; Profitability</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return on Equity</td>
<td>Earnings &amp; Profitability</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquid assets to total liabilities</td>
<td>Liquidity</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>82.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 6.0 Core Set of Financial Soundness Indicators: Life Insurance sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator (%)</th>
<th>Indicates</th>
<th>Dec-10</th>
<th>Mar-11</th>
<th>Jun-11</th>
<th>Sep-11</th>
<th>Dec-11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital to technical reserves</td>
<td>Capital adequacy</td>
<td>136.4</td>
<td>130.7</td>
<td>130.5</td>
<td>122.1</td>
<td>104.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Real estate + unquoted equities + debtors) to total assets</td>
<td>Assets quality</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>79.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Receivables to gross premiums</td>
<td>Assets quality</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>13.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Equities to total assets</td>
<td>Assets quality</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net technical reserves to net premium paid in last year</td>
<td>Reinsurance &amp; actuarial issues</td>
<td>141.5</td>
<td>555.4</td>
<td>290.5</td>
<td>214.5</td>
<td>156.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk retention ratio (net premium to gross premium)</td>
<td>Reinsurance &amp; actuarial issues</td>
<td>97.8</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>98.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gross premium to number of employees J$(000)</td>
<td>Management Soundness</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>20.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assets per employee J$(000)</td>
<td>Management Soundness</td>
<td>122.9</td>
<td>129.9</td>
<td>136.2</td>
<td>138.0</td>
<td>133.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenses to net premium (expense ratio)</td>
<td>Earnings &amp; Profitability</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment Income to investment assets</td>
<td>Earnings &amp; Profitability</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Return on Equity</td>
<td>Earnings &amp; Profitability</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liquid assets to total liabilities</td>
<td>Liquidity</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>22.2</td>
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<td>Duration on assets - Domestic Bonds</td>
<td>Sensitivity to market risk</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>2.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Duration on assets - Global Bonds</td>
<td>Sensitivity to market risk</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
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Table 7.0 Sectoral Indicators of Financial Development

<table>
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<tr>
<th>sub-sector</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Banking</strong></td>
<td>Total number of DTIs</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Number of branches and outlets</td>
<td>179.0</td>
<td>181.0</td>
<td>178.0</td>
<td>173.0</td>
<td>173.0</td>
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<td>Number of branches/thousand population</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bank deposits/GDP (%)</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Bank assets/total financial assets (%)¹</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>42.7</td>
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<td>Bank assets/GDP (%)</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>63.8</td>
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<td><strong>Insurance</strong></td>
<td>Number of insurance companies</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Gross premiums/GDP (%)</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
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<td>Gross life premiums/GDP (%)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
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<td>Gross non-life premiums/GDP (%)</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
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<td><strong>Pensions</strong></td>
<td>Types of pension plans</td>
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<td># Defined Benefit plan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>116</td>
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<td></td>
<td># Defined Contribution plan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>374</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Pension fund assets/GDP (%)</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>22.3</td>
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<td>Pension fund assets/total financial assets (%)</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>15.0</td>
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<td><strong>Mortgage</strong></td>
<td>Mortgage assets/total financial assets (%)</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
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<td>Mortgage assets/GDP (%)</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Securities Dealers</strong></td>
<td>Securities dealer's assets/GDP (%)</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Securities dealer's/total financial assets (%)</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>26.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Total number of securities dealers</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>31.0</td>
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<td><strong>Credit Union</strong></td>
<td>Credit union's assets/GDP (%)</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Credit union's assets/total financial assets (%)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
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<td>Total number of credit unions</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>43.0</td>
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<td><strong>Foreign exchange markets</strong></td>
<td>Adequacy of foreign exchange (reserves in months of imports)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
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<td>foreign exchange reserves as ratio to short-term external debt (%)</td>
<td>168.4</td>
<td>123.3</td>
<td>188.5</td>
<td>217.2</td>
<td>196.8</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Capital markets</strong></td>
<td>Number of listed securities (equities)³</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>55</td>
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<td>Number of new issues (equities)⁵</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of new issues (bonds)⁶</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Value of new issues (equities) J$Bn</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Value of new issues (bonds) J$Bn</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>96.1</td>
<td>222.8</td>
<td>151.6</td>
<td>105.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Market capitalization/GDP (%)</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Value traded/market capitalization (%)</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collective investment funds</strong></td>
<td>Unit trust funds under management (J$Bn)⁷</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of unit trust</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Mutual fund (value of units held by Jamaicans)J$M/NT</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>151.1</td>
<td>164.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

¹ Financial system assets includes assets for banks, insurance companies, credit unions, securities dealers and pension funds.

² Includes data for building societies, commercial banks & National Housing Trust

³ Includes Junior market listings

⁴ Includes preference shares

⁵ Government of Jamaica bonds

⁶ Unit trust portfolios are composed mainly of fixed income securities, equities and real estate investments

- data availability
4. Financial System Sectoral Exposures

4.1 Overview
Deposit-taking institutions’ (DTIs) exposures to household and corporate sector debt increased in 2011, while non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) exposures to these debt categories remained virtually flat in comparison to 2010. The DTIs’ performance occurred against the background of improvements in domestic macroeconomic conditions in 2011, including real GDP growth, continued downward adjustments in interest rates and increased remittance inflows. Despite relatively higher exposure to household and corporate sector debt in 2011, DTIs’ loan quality ratio for both categories of debt showed mixed results. Specifically, asset quality for the household sector recorded a marginal improvement while the asset quality ratio for the corporate sector deteriorated sharply. For NBFIs, the ratio improved in comparison to end-2010.

In contrast to household and corporate debt exposures, DTIs’ exposure to public sector debt declined in 2011. This might have been influenced by protracted uncertainty regarding the status of the country’s financial programme with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This uncertainty increased sovereign risk in the financial system as the Government was unable to extend the maturity profile of its debt stock and to issue a greater proportion of fixed rate relative to variable rate debt, in accordance with its debt strategy. NBFIs, on the other hand increased their exposure to public sector debt in 2011 relative to 2010, albeit marginally.

4.2 Household Debt and DTIs Exposure
Household debt expanded by 9.5 per cent in 2011, relative to 4.3 per cent in 2010, representing the highest annual growth since 2008. However, this was notably well below the average annual increase of 19.1 per cent over the last five years, reflecting continued low demand conditions (see Figure 4.1).1 The growth in 2011 was primarily due to an increase of 15.5 per cent in consumer loans compared to an expansion of 5.1

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1 Household debt incurred with the banking sector is proxied by the sum of residential mortgage loans and consumer loans (which includes credit card receivables).
per cent in the prior year. Growth in household debt was also supported by a 2.8 per cent increase in mortgage loans. However, this increase in mortgage loans represented a deceleration relative to growth of 3.4 per cent in the previous year. Mortgage loans for the household sector continued to be affected by low demand in 2011 due to affordability challenges stemming from weak growth in real disposable income and higher unemployment levels.

Notwithstanding the above, the expansion in household sector credit held by DTIs occurred against the background of improvement in domestic macroeconomic conditions in 2011, including real GDP growth, increased remittance inflows and continued downward adjustments in interest rates.² By extension, consistent with the continued lowering of interest rates by the BOJ, rates on all categories of loans including personal loans as well as medium and long-term loans such as car and mortgage loans declined in 2011 relative to 2010. As at end-2011, the average weighted loans rate for each DTI sub-sector was in the range of 11.0 per cent and 18.0 per cent, relative to a range of 12.4 per cent and 20.4 per cent in 2010 (see Table 4.1). Additionally, the imposition of lower import duties and relaxation of other restrictions on motor vehicles as well as the lowering of stamp duty on refinancing & transfer of existing mortgages, positively impacted on credit growth, in particular consumer loans.

In 2011, household sector debt accounted for approximately 54.0 per cent of DTI’s credit portfolio relative to 51.7 per cent in 2010 and was 4.4 percentage points above the average for the past five years. Additionally, household debt to assets expanded, albeit marginally, during the review period to 24.2 per cent at end-2011 compared to 23.2 per cent in 2010. The increase was mainly reflected in the activities of the commercial banks as the share of household debt to DTIs asset for building societies and FIA licensees declined marginally (see Figure 4.2). In contrast to 2010, household sector loan quality ratio improved marginally in

² In 2011 real GDP grew by 1.3 per cent relative to a contraction of 1.4 per cent in 2010. Additionally, remittance flows also increase to US$2.0 billion in 2011 compared to US$1.9 billion in 2010.
the review year. Specifically, non-performing household loans (NPLs) as a share of total household loans for DTIs declined to 6.0 per cent at end-2011 relative to 7.0 per cent at end-2010. The improvement in the ratio was reflected across all DTI sectors, in particular commercial banks (see Figure 4.3). However, the ratio as at end-2011 was relatively high in comparison to the past five year annual average rate of 4.7 per cent and could be partly attributable to the higher unemployment levels.

Notably, DTIs’ household coverage ratio and capital adequacy positions improved in 2011 relative to 2010. For 2011, the household coverage ratio increased in excess of 100.0 per cent compared to a ratio of 85.9 per cent at the end of the prior year. This was influenced by a 24.7 per cent increase in provisioning and a 5.3 per cent decline in household NPLs (see Figure 4.4). Similarly, the capacity of banks to withstand losses arising from NPLs, as measured by the ratio of household sector NPLs to regulatory capital, improved to 14.4 per cent at end-2011 relative to 16.3 per cent at the end of the previous year. This was due to higher levels of regulatory capital relative to household NPLs.

4.2.1 Household Sector Performance

The debt servicing capacity of the household sector, as measured by the ratio of household debt to disposable income, is estimated to have deteriorated slightly by 1.2 percentage points to 17.5 per cent at end-2011 relative to end-2010 (see Figure 4.5). This was attributed to a faster pace of growth in household sector debt (8.9 per cent) relative to disposable income (1.3 per cent) during the year.

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3 Coverage ratio is measured as the ratio of loan loss provisions plus prudential provisioning to non-performing household loans.
4 Household debt is proxied by the sum of residential mortgage loans, consumer loans (which includes credit card receivables) and NHT loans.
5 Disposable income for 2011 was estimated based on the annual estimated growth rate in real wages.
6 The deterioration in debt servicing capacity also occurred in a context where the performance in real wages has continued to remain weak relative to pre-crisis levels, despite growth of 1.5 per cent recorded during 2011.
4.3 Corporate Sector Debt and DTIs Exposure

Corporate sector debt held by DTIs expanded by 5.9 per cent relative to a contraction of 5.7 per cent in 2010 and an average growth of 15.9 per cent for the past five years (see Figure 4.6). This increase mainly reflected growth of 4.8 per cent in lending for private commercial purposes as this category represented 97.5 per cent of total corporate sector loans at end-2011.7

With the moderate increase in corporate sector debt, DTIs holding of corporate sector debt to DTI assets increased slightly by 0.2 percentage point to 18.0 per cent for 2011. Additionally, there was a marginal increase in the share of corporate sector debt to total loans by 0.4 percentage point to 40.1 per cent relative to 2010.

The marginal increase in DTI exposure to corporate sector debt reflected growth in lending to most economic sectors except Manufacturing, Construction and Professional & Other Services (see Figure 4.8). The sectors that recorded the highest expansion in credit growth were Mining & Quarrying, Electricity and Transport Storage & Communications, averaging 28.2 per cent growth in 2011 relative to average growth of 0.5 per cent in 2010. Notably, growth in lending to these sectors was consistent with increases in their rates of economic growth. Mining & Quarrying, Electricity and Transport Storage & Communications are estimated to have grown by 20.1 per cent, 1.6 per cent and -0.3 per cent, respectively, in 2011 relative to respective declines of 4.3 per cent, 4.3 per cent and 2.0 per cent in 2010.

4.3.1 Corporate Sector Loan Quality

Corporate sector loan quality continued the trend deterioration observed since 2008 and recorded a sharp increase in 2011 relative to 2010. In particular, the ratio of corporate sector NPLs to total corporate sector loans

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7 Corporate sector debt is defined as loans for commercial purposes, loans to other financial institutions and notes & debenture holdings of the banking sector.
increased to 14.2 per cent at end-2011 relative to a value of 6.6 per cent at end-2010. Additionally, the ratio at end-2011 was well above the five year annual average of 3.4 per cent which underscored DTIs’ increased susceptibility to corporate credit risk (see Figure 4.9). The sharp increase in the asset quality ratio for the business sector was mainly reflected in the loan portfolio of the commercial banks which recorded a ratio of 12.1 per cent at end-2011. In examining the delinquency rate by sector, relative to 2010, the loan quality ratio for all economic sectors, with the exception of Distribution, Entertainment and Transport, deteriorated in 2011. Notably, Construction, Tourism and Agriculture, recorded the highest NPL ratios of 31.1 per cent, 18.7 per cent and 17.5 per cent, respectively, in 2011 (see Figure 4.10).

4.3.2 Performance of Companies listed on the Jamaica Stock Exchange (JSE) during 2011

The Jamaica Stock Exchange (JSE) Index advanced by 11.8 per cent for 2011 which compares favourably to the 2.3 per cent gain recorded for 2010 (see Figure 4.11). The improved performance of the JSE index for 2011 occurred against the background of better than expected earnings for several listed entities and positive macro-economic developments. In particular, there was recovery in real GDP growth, a sharp decline in inflation, relative stability in the foreign exchange market and continued reductions in interest rates. Additionally, the announcement of various plans for business expansion by listed corporate entities buoyed investors’ interest in equities and positively impacted the market during the review period.8

Despite the strong growth in the JSE Index for the review period, there was a marked reduction in trading activity as reflected in the overall volumes traded during 2011. The volume of stocks traded declined by 41.3 per cent in 2011 in

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8 These included the planned acquisitions of Capital and Credit Merchant Bank Limited and Pegasus Hotels of Jamaica by Jamaica Money Market Brokers and Quivin International Limited, respectively. Also, within the year, the National Commercial Bank Jamaica Limited announced plans to list on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) while Pan-Jamaican Investments Trust assumed the assets and liabilities of First Jamaica Investments Limited.
During 2011, listed corporate sector entities’ financial leverage ratio remained virtually flat at 80.9 per cent at end-2011 relative to end-2010 (see Figure 4.12). Of note, companies within Finance and Insurance remained highly leveraged while companies within Retail and Other recorded the lowest leverage ratios for the review period.

Overall profitability of listed companies remained relatively flat during 2011 (see Figure 4.13). The asset utilization ratio as measured by average return on assets (ROA) for listed companies declined to 3.5 per cent in 2011 relative to 3.7 per cent in 2010, reflecting lower net profits during the review period for a few large market capitalization stocks such as Guardian Holdings Limited, Trinidad Cement Limited, First Caribbean International Bank and Scotia Group Jamaica. Furthermore, with the exception of a few stocks, many of the listed companies recorded improvements in profitability relative to 2010. Notably, Retail, Other and Conglomerate recorded the highest increases in ROA while stocks from Communications and Manufacturing recorded the steepest declines. Similarly, the ratio of net profits to revenues for listed entities declined in 2011 relative to 2010. This ratio declined to 21.3 per cent from 24.4 per cent in 2010. Furthermore, Retail, Conglomerate and Finance continued to record the highest profit margin ratios while Communications and Manufacturing recorded the lowest ratios (see Figure 4.14).

9 However, it must be noted that the significant increase in market activity during 2010 was primarily concentrated in the first quarter of the year and reflected renewed investor interest associated with the successful completion of the Jamaica Debt Exchange programme as well as the signing of the Stand-By-Arrangement between Jamaica and the International Monetary Fund.

10 Financial leverage ratio is measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. A debt to asset ratio in excess of 65.0 per is typically associated with excessive debt.

11 ROA measures net profits as a proportion of average total assets. The weighted ROA for all listed entities was weighted by the market capitalization for each sector.

12 This implies that for every $1.00 of revenue generated, $0.21 went to the companies’ profit.
The weighted price to earnings (P/E) ratio for listed companies improved in 2011 relative to 2010. At end-2011, the weighted P/E ratio across the sectors averaged 1.8 relative to a ratio of 1.1 in 2010 (see Figure 4.15). With the exception of Finance, Retail and Insurance, all sectors recorded P/E ratios below 1.0.

The solvency ratio for listed companies continued to be high. However, at end-2011, the capital to asset ratio was 19.1 per cent compared to 19.2 per cent at end-2010. Notably, with the exception of Retail and Finance, all other sectors on the Exchange recorded declines in their solvency ratios in 2011 relative to the prior year. In addition, Finance recorded a solvency ratio of 11.1 per cent, well above the regulatory benchmark of 6.0 per cent (see Figure 4.16).

There was deterioration in the ratio of operating expenses to revenues in 2011 (see Figure 4.17). This ratio increased to 81.1 per cent across sectors in 2011 relative to 66.4 per cent in 2010. The deterioration in the ratio reflected the performance of companies across all listed sectors with the exception of Communication.

4.4. Public Sector Debt & DTIs Exposure

Within a context where there was an overall expansion in the stock of loans for DTIs, there was a decline in the holdings of public sector debt in 2011, particularly for commercial banks. This was reflected in a reduction in the ratio of public sector loans and securities to DTIs assets to 19.7 per cent at end-2011, relative to 22.3 per cent at end-2010 (see Figure 4.18). The performance was mainly influenced by declines of 3.6 per cent and 24.5 per cent in DTIs’ holdings of public sector securities and public sector loans, respectively, during the year.

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13 The P/E ratio is calculated as the market value per share divided by the per share earnings of a company. The ratio was then weighted by the market capitalization of each listed company.

14 Exposure to public sector debt is measured by public sector loans and securities as a share of DTIs assets. Public sector comprises Public Entities and Central Government.
4.4.1 Public Sector Indebtedness & Performance

Public sector debt as a share of GDP declined marginally to 129.0 per cent at end-2011 from 129.6 per cent at end-2010, reflecting a slower growth in the debt stock of 7.2 per cent when compared to 13.0 per cent in 2010 (see Figure 4.19). This slower growth in the total debt stock was primarily influenced by a reduction in the rate of expansion of external debt, which increased by 3.7 per cent relative to the increase of 21.9 per cent during 2010.

This reduction was primarily associated with net amortization of Central Government’s external debt (see Figure 4.20). The growth rate in domestic debt, on the other hand, increased by 4.3 percentage points to 10.4 per cent for 2011 and reflected the funding of a larger than budgeted fiscal deficit in a context of weaker than projected revenue flows.

Notwithstanding the above, the fiscal stability ratio (FSR), which captures the stability of government finances, improved marginally to 1.23 at end-2011 from 1.25 at end-2010 (see Figure 4.21). This improvement occurred against the background of improvement in tax revenues relative to 2010. This largely reflected higher PAYE tax receipts due to an increase in salaries following the payment of retroactive salaries to public sector workers. Additionally, cost containment was achieved through expenditure savings due to a lower interest rate path and a reduction in capital expenditure.

Notably, in 2010, the uncertainties regarding the status of the agreement of the country’s financial programme with the IMF affected the Government’s ability to issue a greater proportion of fixed rate relative to variable rate debt as well as limited its ability to extend the maturity profile of the debt stock. These factors consequently resulted in deterioration in the sustainability of the debt profile during 2011. Specifically, at end-2011, the share of domestic fixed rate instruments declined by 2.8 percentage points to 56.5 per cent while

\[\text{FSR} = \frac{\text{Overall fiscal balance}}{\text{Total revenue} - 1}\]

15 The FSR is computed as the ratio of overall fiscal balance to total revenue less 1 (one). The closer the FSR is to zero indicates more stable government finances.
the share of variable rate instruments grew by 2.7 percentage points to 43.4 per cent (see Figure 4.22).

Additionally, the proportion of domestic debt due to mature in 5 years or less increased to 53.8 per cent at end-2011 from 50.7 per cent at end-2010, indicative of increased refinancing risk in the near-term (see Figure 4.23). In terms of the external debt, this portfolio continued to be dominated by long-term fixed rate instruments, thereby containing its vulnerability to interest rate shocks (see Figure 4.24).

4.5. Non-Bank Financial Sector Exposure

4.5.1 Private Sector Debt & Securities Dealers Exposure

The exposure of the twelve largest securities dealers (SDs) to private sector debt remained low during 2011. The ratio of private sector debt to assets for the SDs was virtually flat at 1.7 per cent at end-2011 relative to end-2010 (see Figure 4.25). Notably, of the twelve SDs only six institutions had exposure to private sector debt, which ranged between 0.9 per cent and 3.4 per cent of total assets

Private sector debt held by SDs as a proportion of capital averaged 11.4 per cent for 2011. Relative to 2010, this represented an average decline of 2.0 percentage points in the ratio.

The SDs loan quality ratio as measured by private sector NPLs to private sector loans improved to 4.5 per cent at end-2011 relative to 5.6 per cent at end-2010 (see Figure 4.26). The improvement in the loan quality ratio for the top twelve SDs, relative to end-2010, was reflected across all institutions with the exception of one institution.

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16 Private sector loans incorporate loans to corporate sector entities and personal (household) loans.
17 Data on private sector debt for non-banks was only available for 2011 & 2010.
The coverage ratio for SDs also improved at end-2011 to 158.5 per cent when compared to a ratio of 110.0 per cent at end-2010. Notably, at end-2011 the ratio for the SDs was approximately 1.4 times that of the DTIs and represented strong levels of provisioning (see Figure 4.26).

4.5.2 Public Sector Debt & Securities Dealers Exposure
SDs holdings of public sector debt increased at end-2011 relative to their holdings at end-2010. The ratio of public sector debt to assets grew to 48.5 per cent at end-2011 (twice that of DTIs) compared to a ratio of 46.7 per cent at end-2010 (see Figure 4.27). This increase reflected growth of 3.5 per cent in the holdings of public sector securities. Conversely, public sector debt holdings to capital declined steadily to 363.4 per cent at end-2011 from a ratio of 380.4 per cent at end-2010. However, the ratio was significantly higher when compared to a ratio of 95.7 per cent for DTIs recorded at end-2011.

4.5.3 Public Sector Debt & Insurance Sector Exposure
Similar to the SDs, exposure to public sector debt increased for the insurance sector during 2011. The ratio of public sector debt holdings to assets increased to 57.1 per cent at end-2011 relative to 56.9 per cent at end-2010 (see Figure 4.28). Of note, this ratio was 63.7 per cent and 36.7 per cent for the life and general insurance companies, respectively, during 2011. This compared to ratios of 63.1 per cent and 32.9 per cent, respectively, during 2010. As a proportion of capital, public sector debt holdings for the insurance sector increased to 205.5 per cent at end-2011 relative to a ratio of 179.6 per cent at end-2010 (see Figure 4.29). This high ratio was influenced mainly by the life insurance sector which recorded a ratio of 227.8 per cent at end-2011 while the general insurance companies recorded a ratio of 127.6 per cent.

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18 Public sector debt is measured as the sum of public sector loans and public sector securities. While, exposure is defined as public sector debt as a proportion of assets.
Figure 4.30 Investments in other assets for the financial sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mar-10</th>
<th>Jun-10</th>
<th>Sep-10</th>
<th>Dec-10</th>
<th>Mar-11</th>
<th>Jun-11</th>
<th>Sep-11</th>
<th>Dec-11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investments in Equities to Assets (DTIs)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments in Equities to Assets (SDS)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments in Equities to Assets (Insurance Sector) (RHS)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments in Real Estate to Assets: Insurance Sector (RHS)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.5.4 Other Asset Exposures

The insurance sector’s exposure to equities and real estate investments continued to be relatively small compared to their exposure to public sector debt. During 2011, the ratios of equity investments to assets and real estate investments to assets for the insurance sector averaged 1.7 per cent and 0.9 per cent, respectively. This is in comparison to average ratios of 2.0 per cent and 1.1 per cent recorded during 2010.

In comparison, the exposures of SDs and DTIs to equities investments remained flat at 0.6 per cent and 0.9 per cent, respectively, during 2011 relative to 2010 (see Figure 4.30).

4.6 Pension Industry Exposure to Governments Securities, Equities & Real Estate

At end-2011, the pension industry continued to have the highest exposure to Investments in Governments Securities (44.5 per cent), as well as Investment Arrangement (25.9 per cent) which includes investments in deposit administration contracts and pooled funds, when compared to investment in the other investment classes (see Table 4.2). This represented an increase relative to values of 43.7 per cent and 23.0 per cent, respectively, recorded at end-2010. For the review period there was increased exposure to equities investments to 11.7 per cent from 9.6 per cent at the end-2010. This could be attributed to the reduction in interest rates on fixed income securities during 2010 and 2011. However, pension fund exposure to real estate declined marginally by 0.2 percentage point to 5.2 per cent largely due to faster pace of growth in their asset base.

Table 4.2 Investments classes as a per cent of total assets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pension Industry</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investments in Governments Securities to Assets (%)</td>
<td>41.87</td>
<td>43.69</td>
<td>44.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments in Equities to Assets (%)</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments in Real Estate to Assets (%)</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment Arrangement to Assets (%)</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Investments to Assets (%)</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Asset values (J$bn)</td>
<td>228.6</td>
<td>259.1</td>
<td>283.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1) Governments securities includes Government of Jamaica securities and other sovereign securities from the US, UK and Canada.
2) An investment arrangement describes investments in deposit administration contracts and pooled funds.
5. Risks Assessment of the Financial Sector

5.1 Overview
Deposit-taking institutions (DTIs) remained robust to hypothetical liquidity, market and credit shocks during 2011. However, while liquidity and market risk exposures remained subdued during 2011, the exposure to credit-related risks persisted during the year. Based on stress test results, exposure to credit risk remained the most significant exposure of the DTIs. In addition, the exposure of DTIs to interest rate risk increased significantly, while foreign exchange risk and liquidity-related risks remained negligible (see Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2). The non-banking financial sector also remained robust to a wide range of market and liquidity shocks during 2011. However, while securities dealers reduced their exposure to interest rate risk their exposure to liquidity funding risk increased.

5.2 Liquidity Funding Risk Assessment of the Banking System
The DTI sector continued to rely primarily on deposits to fund its activities during 2011. Deposits as a proportion of banking system funding increased to 81.5 per cent at end-2011 from 78.1 per cent at end-2010. In terms of other sources of funding, DTIs relied significantly less on ‘other borrowing’ relative to the preceding year and marginally more on inter-bank funding. Specifically, inter-bank funding and borrowings accounted for an average of 15.8 per cent and 4.1 per cent of the funding base of DTIs during 2011, respectively, relative to an average of 18.2 per cent and 4.3 per cent at end-2010. There was also a slowdown in the annual growth of the DTI’s funding base to 1.5 per cent for 2011 relative to a five-year average growth of 9.4 per cent. The marginal increase in the funding base was influenced by growth in deposits of 5.0 per cent, the impact of which was partially offset by a 19.4 per cent reduction in ‘other borrowing’. In addition, inter-bank funding declined by 8.7 per cent during 2011 relative to a reduction of 11.2 per cent in 2010 and a five-year average growth of 17.8 per cent (see Figure 5.3).

In Figure 5.1 the size of each node is scaled in proportion to the total value of exposure arising from the stress test as at end-March 2011 and end-2011.
The liquidity risk exposure of the DTI sector remained low during 2011 as reflected in the trends in several measures of liquidity risk. In particular, the loans-to-deposit ratio remained relatively flat at 66.8 per cent at end-2011 relative to 67.0 per cent at end-2010. The stability in this ratio over the year was a result of an increase in the annual growth rate of deposits which was matched by an almost similar increase in loan growth rate. Furthermore, the liquidity ratio of the system trended downwards for the year, as DTIs recorded a ratio of 30.8 per cent at end-2011 relative to 36.2 per cent as at end-2010. Additionally, DTIs reserves of liquidity in excess of those prescribed by the Bank waned. Of note, these reserves fell off in the last quarter of 2011 (see Figure 5.4). Finally, the ratio of short-term assets to short-term liabilities for DTIs, deteriorated with the exception of the FIA licensees sector, deteriorated, indicating slightly elevated short-term liquidity risk (see Figure 5.5). At end-2011, in excess of 40.0 per cent and 30.0 per cent of short-term liabilities were backed by short-term assets for commercial banks and building societies, respectively. In contrast, only 26.9 per cent of short-term liabilities were backed by short-term assets of the FIA licensees sector, albeit a significant increase relative to the 5.6 per cent obtained in the prior year.

During 2011, liquidity funding stress tests indicated that all DTIs were adequately capitalised to absorb hypothetical losses associated with a decline in deposits. Specifically, after a hypothetical 10.0 per cent decline in average deposits, it was revealed that all DTIs had post-shock capital adequacy ratios (CARs) above the regulatory benchmark of 10.0 per cent. However, there was a slight decrease in the median post-shock CAR of the system during 2011 which reflected the slight increase in susceptibility of banks to liquidity funding risk (see Figure 5.6).

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2 The 'hair cut' (% loss in value) applied in the stress testing framework on liquidating each category of assets are: items in course of collection (10.0%), non-liquid investments (20.0%), accounts receivables (20.0%), loans & advances (28.0%), Fixed Assets (36.0%), Other Assets (90.0%) and resultant losses are written off against the capital buffers first and then statutory capital.
Market Risk Assessment of Deposit-Taking Institutions

The composition of the investment portfolio of commercial banks and building societies remained more heavily weighted in Jamaica Dollar denominated bonds relative to positions in foreign currency denominated securities and equities for 2011. In contrast, the FIA sector held the largest proportion of their portfolio in foreign currency securities. Relative to end-2010, all sub-sectors within the DTI system, with the exception of FIA licensees, marginally increased their position in Jamaica Dollar securities. However, while there was a slight increase in holdings of foreign currency bonds for institutions in the commercial bank and building societies sub-sectors (see Chapter 3.13).

Conditions in the domestic financial markets remained benign as reflected in a downward trend in yields on domestic instruments, complemented by a reduction in the volatility in yields. Improved market perception of the stability of the system, was reflected in the trend decline in the median implied volatility of assets of publicly-listed DTIs. Furthermore, latent concerns about financial system stability faded as indicated by the narrowing of the inter-quartile range for the implied volatility of assets of publicly-listed DTIs relative to end-2010 (see Figure 5.7).

Concurrently, the duration of domestic bonds held by DTIs increased to 0.72 at end-2011 from 0.66 at end-2010 (see Figure 5.8). This represented a reversal of the declining trend in duration for the sector recorded for 2010. The trend in 2011 was largely influenced by the commercial bank and the building society sub-sectors. The duration of foreign currency securities held by DTIs increased to 2.59 at end-2011 from 1.97 at end-2010. The increase in the duration factors for the system highlighted a greater exposure to interest rate risk during 2011. Similar trends were observed for the interest rate risk exposure of the DTIs for both domestic and foreign currency securities. Specifically, the domestic dollar value of a percentage point to capital (DDVPC) for DTIs declined to 0.13 per cent at end-2011 from 0.26 per cent at end-2010. Similarly, during 2011 the DDVPC for foreign...
currency securities declined by 0.53 percentage point to 0.7 per cent relative to end-2010 (see Figure 5.9). During 2011, interest rate risk stress tests indicated that all DTI sectors were adequately capitalised to absorb losses associated with large but plausible hypothetical increases in interest rates. Additionally, both the inter-quartile range and the median quarterly post-shock CAR decreased after a hypothetical increase of 1 100.0 basis points in interest rates (see Figure 5.10). Further, consequent on the relatively small movements in yields in bond markets and the trend declines in the duration targeted by DTIs, the risk of the system to reductions in interest rates declined even further during 2011. This was evidenced in the decline as well as the narrowing in the inter-quartile range for the DTIs’ value-at-risk (VaR) estimates during 2011 (see Figure 5.11).³

The foreign exchange market returned to relative stability during 2011 compared to the bouts of instability observed over the previous year. This stability was particularly noticeable after the first quarter of 2011 as there was a decline in volatility in the first quarter of the year (see Figure 5.12). At end-2011, the exchange rate was US$1:J$86.34, reflecting a depreciation in the Jamaica Dollar of 0.85 per cent for 2011.

The net open position (NOP) of the DTI system increased during 2011. Relative to end-2010, DTIs increased their long position in US dollar assets by 71.0 per cent to US$333.9 million (see Figure 5.13). This increase in the NOP was observed across each of the DTI sub-sectors. Consequently, DTIs’ exposure to foreign currency risk increased as reflected in a higher NOP to capital of 30.1 per cent, relative to 21.9 per cent at end-2010. DTIs also expanded their risk exposure to non-foreign currency earners during the review year.

³ The DVPC captures the dollar value loss of a percentage point increase in domestic bond yields as a proportion of the capital base.
This was reflected in DTIs loans to non-foreign exchange earners which increased to the equivalent of $18,361.0 million at end-2011 relative to $17,665.0 million at end-2010. Further, loans to non-foreign exchange earners as a proportion of total loans extended by DTIs increased by 1.2 percentage points to an average of 15.9 per cent compared to end-2010 (see Figure 5.14).

At end-2011, all DTIs were adequately capitalised to absorb losses associated with significant hypothetical depreciations of the Jamaica Dollar vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar. Specifically, after a hypothetical 30.0 per cent depreciation, the median post-shock CARs across all DTI sub-sectors trended upwards except for one sub-sector, relative to the average median post-shock CARs recorded during 2010. The median post-shock CAR for commercial banks remained relatively flat and comfortably above the 10.0 per cent CAR benchmark during 2011. Building societies were minimally affected by the shocks applied in 2011 and generally exhibited slightly elevated median post-shock CAR relative to 2010. The median post-shock CAR for the FIA licensees sector also remained relatively flat during 2011 reflecting muted levels of risk to foreign exchange rate-related shocks. However, increased levels of vulnerability to a foreign exchange rate shock for the FIA licensees sector were observed at end-2011 as reflected in the decline in the median post-shock CAR as well as a narrowing of the inter-quartile range for the year (see Figure 5.15).

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4 Shocks are applied firstly to the exchange rate between the Jamaica Dollar and the US dollar. The corresponding exchange rates of the Jamaica Dollar vis-à-vis the Euro, the Canadian dollar, and the Pound Sterling are then incorporated based on historical correlations with the selling rate for the US dollar between January and May 2003.
5.4 Credit Risk Assessment of DTIs

Over 2011, exposure to credit risk remained the most significant risk to DTIs based on aggregate stress test results (see Figure 5.16).

The increased susceptibility of the DTI sector to credit risk was underscored by continued deterioration in the non-performing loans (NPL) ratio, reserves for loan losses ratio and loans and securities provision ratios. However, the write-off rate decreased to 1.6 per cent of total loans at end-2011 from 2.0 per cent at the beginning of 2010, having peaked at 2.3 per cent at end-October 2010. Nonetheless write-off rates remained elevated relative to a five year historical average of 1.1 per cent. At the same time, provisioning ratios increased for building societies and FIA licensees but declined for commercial banks during 2011. The building societies sector recorded an increase in the ratio of provisioning to NPLs to 62.6 per cent at end-2011 relative to 49.6 per cent at end-2010. Similarly, the ratio of provisioning to NPLs increased by 25.9 percentage points to 73.7 per cent at end-2011, relative to end-2010 for FIA licensees. In contrast, the ratio of provisioning to NPLs declined by 5.8 percentage points to 78.6 per cent for commercial banks relative to end-2010 (see Figure 5.17). An overall decline in provisioning ratios for DTIs, driven by the commercial bank sub-sector, was implicitly consistent with the decline in write-off rates observed during the year.

The median NPL to capital ratio for DTIs increased marginally during 2011 relative to 2010. The ratio averaged 28.2 per cent for the review year, relative to an average of 20.2 per cent recorded for 2010. In addition, a widening of the inter-quartile range for NPLs to capital for DTIs underscored an increasing exposure to credit risk. This ratio increased to within an inter-quartile range of 18.5 per cent to 49.3 per cent at end-2011 relative to a range of 17.8 per cent to 40.0 per cent at end-2010. Additionally, the maximum ratio of NPLs to capital recorded across all DTIs

5 Write-off rate is computed as the ratio of “Charged off assets” for the year to “Loans, advances & discounts (net of provisions)”
increased sharply to 154.1 per cent from 119.6 per cent at end-2010 (see Figure 5.18).

Despite the continued deterioration in DTI loan quality, the CAR for all sectors, except the FIA licensees sector, remained adequate to absorb a hypothetical 30.0 per cent increase in NPLs. Specifically, both the commercial bank and the building society sectors showed consistent levels of robustness against large but plausible hypothetical shocks to NPLs over the review year. However, the FIA licensees post-shock CAR, showed an increased level of susceptibility to the hypothetical shock (see Figure 5.19).

Reverse stress testing exercises conducted for the building societies sector suggest that it would take a larger increase in the NPLs at end-2011 to cause the most vulnerable institution to have its CAR fall below 10.0 per cent relative to end-2010. Specifically, at end-2011 it would take a 160.0 per cent increase in NPLs for the first building society to breach the regulatory minimum CAR relative to an increase of 50.0 per cent at end-2010. In contrast, reverse stress testing assessments of the FIA licensees sector revealed increasing susceptibility to credit-related risks as it would take a smaller increase in NPLs at end-2011 to cause the most vulnerable institution to have its CAR fall below 10.0 per cent. Specifically, at end-2011, it would take a 20.0 per cent increase in NPLs to bring the CAR of the weakest institution below the regulatory minimum relative to an increase of 175.0 per cent at end-2010 (see Figure 5.20).

5.5 Liquidity Funding Risk Exposure Assessment of Securities Dealers

Liquidity funding risk of the securities dealers sector as measured by the ratio of short-term assets to liabilities remained muted at end-2011 relative to end-2012. The ratio of short-term assets to liabilities increased marginally to 16.6 per cent from...
16.0 per cent at end-2010. The decline in the ratio reflected a 5.2 per cent reduction in short-term assets to $21 227.00 million at end-2011. Similarly, short-term liabilities decreased by 8.4 per cent to $128 037.70 million at end-2011 (see Figure 5.21).

The liquidity funding stress test for the twelve largest securities dealers, involving a hypothetical 10.0 per cent reduction in retail repo-liabilities showed that all entities would have post-shock CARs above the regulatory minimum of 12.0 per cent. The average median post-shock CAR during 2011 was 31.6 per cent. However, the increased exposure to liquidity funding risk was reflected in both a downward trend and narrowing of the inter-quartile range of the post-shock CARs over the year. The median post-shock CAR declined to 20.4 per cent at end-2011 from 46.0 per cent at end-March 2011 (see Figure 5.22).

### 5.6 Market Risk Exposure Assessment of Securities Dealers

During 2011, the investment portfolio of the securities dealers sector remained tilted towards Jamaica Dollar denominated bonds. In particular, securities dealers held on average 59.1 per cent of their investment portfolio in Jamaica Dollar securities compared to 40.3 per cent in foreign currency securities. Investments in equity securities remained marginal during 2011.

Securities dealers exposure to interest rate risk increased during 2011, as reflected in the lengthening of the duration of both their domestic and foreign currency bond portfolios. This was more pronounced in their foreign currency bond portfolio which recorded an increase in duration to 2.3 at end-2011 from 1.6 at end-2010 (see Figure 5.23). Interest rate risk stress testing revealed that securities dealers were robust to large hypothetical shocks to interest rates. The sector recorded a median post-shock CAR of 30.3 per cent in response to the shock at end-2011 (see Figure 5.24). Concurrently, the trend increase in duration, the downside risk of the sector remained relatively flat during 2011. The highest value-at-risk (VaR) estimate was 0.34 per cent of the sector’s investment portfolio, slightly below the maximum of 0.40 per cent which obtained during 2011. Further, the maximum...
security dealer VaR increased to 0.34 per cent at end-2011 relative to 0.31 per cent at end-March 2011 (see Figure 5.25).

The exposure of the securities dealers sector to foreign exchange rate risk decreased during 2011. The NOP of the securities sector declined to US$8.2 million at end-2011 from US$126.6 million at end March 2011. As a proportion of regulatory capital, the exposure of the sector declined to 14.3 per cent at end-2011 relative to 35.7 per cent at end-March 2010. Further, the median ratio of NOP to capital declined to 20.9 per cent at end-2010 relative to 19.1 per cent at end-March 2011 (see Figure 5.26).

Against this background, the post-shock CARs of the securities dealers sector remained above the 12.0 per cent benchmark as a result of the contemplated 30.0 per cent depreciation in the exchange rate (see Figure 5.27).

5.7 Liquidity Funding Risk Exposure Assessment of Insurance Companies

Insurance companies’ balance sheets remained robust to large but plausible hypothetical shocks to funding sources during 2011. Of note, however, post-shock minimum continuing capital surplus requirements (MCCSRs) for the life insurance sector declined during 2011, but remained comfortably above the regulatory benchmark of 150.0 per cent, signalling resiliency of the sector to absorb the contemplated shocks. The general insurance sector, on the other hand, showed increased resiliency to the contemplated shocks to funding sources. Most, of the resulting post-shock minimum capital tests (MCTs) reflected improvement in the actual ratios rather than the impact of the liquidity shock (see Figure 5.28).

5.8 Market Risk Exposure Assessment of Insurance Companies

The exposure of the life insurance sector to market risk remained low during 2011. The VAR for the sector recorded an average of 0.09 per cent for the year (see Figure 5.29). This outturn occurred in the context of benign movements in bond yields supported by slight reduction in the duration of foreign bond...
portfolios held by the sector. The duration on the foreign bond portfolio declined to 5.3 years at end-2011 relative to 5.6 years at end-2010.

On the contrary, the duration on the domestic bond portfolio increased to 2.0 years relative to a duration of approximately 0.0 at end-2010 (see Figure 5.29). Life insurance companies’ balance sheets remained robust to large but plausible hypothetical shocks to interest rates during 2011 as the post-shock MCCSRs, despite declining, were comfortably above the regulatory benchmark of 150.0 per cent (see Figure 5.30).

### 5.9 Contagion Risk Assessment of the Domestic Financial System

Activities in the domestic inter-bank market declined at a slower pace relative to 2010. In particular, borrowing in the inter-bank sector declined on an annual basis by 0.8 per cent during 2011, relative to a 15.5 per cent reduction in 2010. Of note, these declines were spurred by increased uncertainty related to counter-party risk in this segment of the market.

Despite increased inter-bank funding during 2011, the uncertainty in inter-bank activity during 2011 reflected itself in increased periods of non-trading in the inter-bank market as well as sharp and persistent increases in inter-bank rates. For instance, the number of days with no reported trading activity increased to 50 for 2011 compared to 41 and 38 recorded in 2010 and 2009, respectively. Correspondingly, the maximum inter-bank rate for 2011 declined to 12.0 per cent relative to maximum rates of 18.0 per cent and 32.0 per cent recorded for 2010 and 2009, respectively (see Figure 5.31).

At end-2011, the building societies sector continued to be net borrowers in the inter-bank market while securities dealers and commercial banks were generally net lenders. The securities dealers sector had the largest net exposure, both in dollar value as

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6 In response, the Bank established an intermediation facility for Jamaica Dollar and US dollar transactions within the inter-bank market in 2008. This facility assisted in the provision of liquidity to net-borrowers in the inter-bank market as well as the mitigation of counter-party risks to net lenders in the market (see Figure 5.23).
well as relative to the size of their capital base, in the inter-bank market followed by the commercial banking sector. The building societies sector, also had significant exposure to the securities dealer and commercial banking sectors relative to the size of their capital base at end-2011 (see Figure 5.32). However, the exposure to counter-party risk of the insurance sector and the FIA licensees sector remained negligible at end-2011.

Stress testing of counter-party risk exposures for the financial system revealed that the securities dealers sector was most exposed to contagion risk emanating from the building societies sector. Building societies were also exposed significantly to counter-party risk from the securities dealer sector. However, following the hypothetical shock there were no domino impacts leading to second round effects. The median post-shock CARs were 6.8 per cent, 6.1 per cent, and 14.3 per cent for the commercial bank, building society and securities dealer sectors, respectively (see Figure 5.33).

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7 A large exposure is one that exceeds 10% of a lending bank’s regulatory capital at the end of a period.
8 The size of each node is scaled in proportion to the total value of net credit exposure to other financial institutions while the direction of the arrow indicates the counter-party to which the institution is exposed.
9 The thickness of the line is proportional to the value of a single bilateral exposure. Red lines represent exposure in excess of 35.0 per cent of capital, and black lines indicate exposures in excess of 10.0 per cent of capital. Dotted black lines represent exposures which are less than 5.0 per cent of capital.
10 Stress testing of counter-party risk exposures for the financial system involved the assessment of the hypothetical failure of a financial entity which exposed the financial system to the largest counter-party credit risk.
6. Payments System Developments

6.1 Overview
Growth in currency improved during 2011 against the background of continued growth in real sector activities during the year. Furthermore, overall average monthly Automated Banking Machine (ABM) and Point-of-Sale (POS) volumes and values increased by 13.7 per cent and 6.1 per cent, respectively, during the year, reflecting improvements in real wages and remittance inflows. Growth in the average value and volume of transactions by cheque declined significantly during the year in the context of the implementation of an upper limit on transactions in the ACH.

Activities in the JamClear systems – JamClear-RTGS and JamClear CSD - increased substantially during 2011. In addition, transactions via the RTGS as a proportion of the total value of transactions in the RTGS and ACH increased to 91.0 per cent at end-2011 relative to 82.0 per cent at end-2010, indicative of lower payment system credit risk during the review period.

6.2 Traditional Means of Payment
There was stronger growth in currency in circulation during 2011. For the year, currency in circulation increased by 9.0 per cent to $52.9 billion relative to 8.7 per cent for 2010. Measures of the role of currency in economic activity showed weak performance during 2011. The average monthly level of currency in circulation as a share of GDP increased by 0.1 percentage point to 3.6 per cent at end-2011 while average currency in circulation as a share of M1 also increased marginally to 44.4 per cent relative to 43.8 per cent at end-2010. Furthermore, growth in currency during the review period was generally in line with the average increase of 6.0 per cent over the last 3 years but still remained well below the average growth of approximately 15.0 per cent for the five years prior to 2008 when the global economic slowdown had intensified.
Concurrently, growth in average volume and value of transactions by cheque declined substantially during the review period. Average monthly volume and value of transactions by cheque fell by 8.5 per cent and 34.8 per cent to 1.6 million and $255.8 billion, respectively. In addition, there was a decline in the proportion of inter-bank cheque payments to 52.0 per cent at end-2011 relative to 57.0 per cent at end-2010. This decline largely reflected the impact of the implementation of the ACH value threshold on 01 April 2011, which resulted in a higher level of payment system safety during the year (see Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3).\(^1\) Furthermore, the volume and value of proprietary or intra-bank cheque payments were higher relative to inter-bank cheque payments for 2011. However, the average size of intra-bank cheque payments ($156,079.00) was lower than the average size for inter-bank cheque payments ($169,204.00) for the review period.

\(^1\) Effective April 1, 2011, the BOJ implemented a large value threshold for the ACH, whereby transactions $5 million and above are to be cleared via the RTGS system instead of through the ACH. Furthermore, failure of each bank to reduce its large value transactions by 50.0 per cent during 2011 would result in a penalty of $5,000.0 for each transaction of this value which is processed through the ACH.
6.3 Electronic Payment Instruments

During 2011, average monthly ABM and POS values and volumes increased by 13.7 per cent and 6.1 per cent to $29.8 billion and 5.0 billion, respectively. This performance compared favorably to respective monthly declines in values and volumes of 5.1 per cent and 12.0 per cent for 2010, but remained below growth of 22.6 per cent and 21.9 per cent, respectively, for 2009. The stronger performance during 2011 is reflective of improvement in real wages and sustained growth in net remittance inflows since 2010. Real wages grew by 1.5 per cent in 2011 relative to a decline of 12.3 per cent in 2010. At the same time, net remittance flows increased by 6.3 per cent following growth of 6.8 per cent for 2010.2

Regarding ABM transactions, average monthly ABM values increased by 9.5 per cent for 2011 to $17.2 billion relative to a decline of 14.5 per cent for 2010 (see Figure 6.4). However, average monthly ABM volumes declined by 4.4 per cent following a decline of 18.8 per cent in 2010. Conversely, average monthly POS values grew by a faster rate of 20.0 per cent for 2011 to $12.6 billion compared to growth of 13.5 per cent in 2010 (see Figure 6.5). Similarly, average monthly POS volumes grew by 9.1 per cent during 2011 relative to growth of 3.9 per cent during 2010. In addition, regarding the performance of measures of payment system safety through these payments instruments, ABM and POS intra-bank value and volumes as a share of overall values and volumes remained roughly unchanged at respective values of 68.0 per cent and 65.0 per cent at end-2011 (see Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7).

During 2011, there was continued improvement in the values of US dollar-denominated credit card transactions using the internet. This was underpinned by the increased ease of making US dollar payments in the context of the continued stability in the foreign exchange market during 2011 (see Figure 6.8).

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2 Reflects employee average real earnings per week based on all sectors.
The number of ABM terminals in operation by commercial banks declined to 423 at end-2011 relative to 430 at end-2010. In addition, during the year, the number of terminals decommissioned totalled 38 exceeding the 31 terminals installed during the period. There were also 14,336 POS terminals in operation by commercial banks at end-2011 relative to 13,233 POS terminals in operation at end-2010 (see Figure 6.10).

A comparative analysis of payment systems statistics in Jamaica relative to selected Latin American and Caribbean economies was done to ascertain the degree of access to AMB and POS instruments. AMB and POS outreach per 1000 sq. km for Jamaica was relatively high compared to the other territories while deposits as a share of GDP was among the lowest, which is indicative of a lower savings rate for the country (see Table 6.1). Savings data for Jamaica also showed the lowest number of deposit accounts per 1000 adults and that average deposit account value as a share of per capita income remained below values for all Latin American countries examined, except for Colombia. A further implication of this is reflected to some extent in the relatively low loans value as a share of GDP, which is indicative of a relatively lower role of loans in financing economic activity for Jamaica.

Regarding cards in circulation, Jamaica Dollar denominated debit cards increased steadily during 2011 to approximately 1.89 million at the close of the year from 1.87 million at end-2010 (see Figure 6.11). However, credit cards in circulation declined to 196,671 at end-2011 from 209,974 at end-2010. At the same time, credit card receivables of DTIs increased marginally by 1.4 per cent to J$20,607.2 million at end-2011 relative to J$20,327.4 million at end-2010.

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3 Countries were chosen based on data availability.
4 Data on accounts per 1000 adults, average account value as a share of per capita income and POS outreach was unavailable for the other Caribbean economies which were examined.
6.4 Large Value Transfer System

During 2011, there were substantial increases in activities in the JamClear systems (JamClear-RTGS and JamClear CSD). In particular, the total value of RTGS transactions was $12 500.0 billion, reflecting a significant increase of 20.2 per cent relative to 2010 (see Figure 6.12). In addition, RTGS volumes totalled 170 600 for 2011, increasing by 36.4 per cent relative to 2010 (see Figure 6.13). However, during the review period, the average RTGS credit transfer totalled $73.3 million, 11.9 per cent below the average RTGS credit transfer of $83.2 million for 2010. Nonetheless, transactions via the RTGS, as a proportion of total value of transactions in the RTGS and Automated Clearing House (ACH) combined, increased to 91.0 per cent for 2011 relative to 82.0 per cent for 2010. This was indicative of lower payment system credit risk given that the RTGS is based on real time settlement versus the deferred net settlement of the ACH.

Average monthly value and volume of CSD transactions increased significantly to $1 804.0 billion and 17 012, respectively, for 2011 from respective values and volumes of $1 234.0 billion and 12 427 during 2010 (see Figure 6.16). Regarding transactions processed in the JamClear-CSD during 2011, GOJ fixed rate (FR) notes continued to be the most liquid securities in terms of volumes traded. Nonetheless, with the exception of February and August 2011, which are interest payment periods for GOJ Benchmark securities, volumes traded increased for GOJ VRB notes and declined for GOJ FR notes. The reduced liquidity as it relates to GOJ FR securities could have been indicative of increased uncertainty relating to the delays in quarterly reviews of Jamaica’s medium-term economic programme with the IMF. In terms of transaction size, for most months, the FR USD notes accounted for the largest values traded during the year.

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5 The RTGS system was implemented on February 27, 2009.
6 Transactions processed in the JamClear-CSD include a wide range of transaction types including repurchase and reverse repurchase transactions, pledges and primary issues.
The use of the intra-day repo facility provided by the BOJ increased by 46.1 per cent during 2011. The Bank’s provision of intra-day repos totalled $543 590.0 billion at end-2011 relative to $371 984.0 billion at end-2010 and was concentrated mainly in the same four institutions. Of the fifteen participants utilizing the facility, the percentage of funds demanded by four institutions remained well over 50.0 per cent during most of the review period and may be indicative of possible sources of systemic payment system risks (see Figure 6.17). Similar to 2010, the median size of funds demanded by institutions was higher in the second half of the year, which may have been influenced by greater seasonal demands for funds during this period. Funds demanded during the second half of the year totalled $339 638.0 billion relative to a total of $203 952.0 billion up to end-June 2011 (see Figure 6.18).

Based on monthly RTGS transaction values, the bulk of funds demanded and supplied were mainly concentrated mainly within three institutions during 2011. The median percentage of funds demanded and supplied also remained at low levels of below 0.1 per cent during most of the year (see Figures 6.19 and 6.20). This degree of concentration has the potential to trigger payment system disruptions and jeopardize payment system safety.

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7 Access to the intra-day ‘Auto Repo’ facility was offered by the Bank starting in July 2009.
Furthermore, the Herfindahl index of payment activity averaged 0.19, a marginal decline relative to the previous year, but nonetheless supported the notion of a fairly strong degree of concentration (see Figure 6.21). An analysis of the Risk Index for payment system concentration also showed that payment concentration remained high for the review year. The Index values for the two most active banks increased to an average of 29.6 per cent during 2011 relative to an average of 26.6 per cent during 2010. The average Risk Index value for the remaining banks increased to an average of 3.0 per cent for 2011 relative to an average of 2.8 per cent for 2010 (see Figure 6.22). Similar to 2010, inter-quartile ranges show that most institutions were low net demanders and suppliers of funds.

8 The Herfindahl index is computed as

\[ HI_{\text{payments}} = \sum_{\text{banks}} \left( \frac{\text{Bank_i Payments}}{\text{Total Payments}} \right)^2 \]

where if the Index is equally divided between N participants, then the Herfindahl measure of concentration equals 1/N.

9 This measure is computed based on payments made and received by each bank as a share of overall payments for the system.
6.5 Traditional Versus Electronic Means of Payment

During 2011, ABM and POS were the dominant means of payment in terms of volumes and ranked second in terms of values when compared to ABM and POS and RTGS transactions during 2011 (see Figures 6.23 and 6.24). More specifically, for the review period, transaction values for cheques, ABM and POS and RTGS totaled J$3 069.0 billion, J$358.0 billion and J$12, 500 billion while transaction volumes totaled 60.5 million, 19.0 million and 170 600, respectively.
### Table 6.1

**Retail Payment Statistics**<sup>1</sup>  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jamaica&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Barbados</th>
<th>Guyana</th>
<th>Colombia</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Peru</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commercial Banks</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deposits</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts per 1000 adults</td>
<td>749.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1267.4</td>
<td>1065.4</td>
<td>783.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value (% of GDP)</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>109.2</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. account value (% income per capita)</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Loans</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts per 1000 adults</td>
<td>131.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>469.8</td>
<td>533.5</td>
<td>317.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value (% of GDP)</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. account value (% income per capita)</td>
<td>159.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>109.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outreach</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branches per 100,000 adults</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branches per 1000 sq. km.</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>97.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATMs per 100,000 adults</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>112.1</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATMs per 1000 sq. km.</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>193.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POS per 100,000 adults</td>
<td>529.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>441.1</td>
<td>2247.4</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POS per 1,000 sq. km.</td>
<td>1323.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>124.7</td>
<td>375.6</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Broad money (% GDP)</strong></td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>151.8</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>1</sup>Source: Bank of Jamaica, STATIN, IMF, the World Bank and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP).

<sup>2</sup>Figures for Jamaica as at end-2011 and information for other countries based on 2010 data. In addition, data on broad money as a share of GDP for Barbados is based on 2009 data.
## Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asset Utilization</strong></td>
<td>This is a ratio which reflects the overall yield on earning assets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Automated Clearing House</strong></td>
<td>A facility that computes the payment obligations of participants, vis-à-vis each other based on payment messages transferred over an electronic system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central Securities Depository</strong></td>
<td>An institution which provides the service of holding securities and facilitating the processing of securities transactions in a book entry (electronic) form.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Certificate of Participation</strong></td>
<td>A financial instrument in which an investor has a <em>pro rata</em> share of lease revenue made by a municipal or government entity over a specified period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concentration Risk</strong></td>
<td>The risk associated with the possibility that any single exposure produces losses large enough to adversely affect an institution’s ability to carry out their core operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consumer Confidence Index</strong></td>
<td>An indicator of consumers’ sentiments regarding their current situation and expectations of the future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Credit Rating</strong></td>
<td>A rating assigned to a borrower, which may be alphabetic or numerical, which indicates the probability associated with the party paying back a loan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Risk</td>
<td>The risk that a counterparty will be unable to settle payment of all obligations when due or in the future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deferred Net Settlement</td>
<td>The settlement of transfer orders netted at designated times between or among counterparties in order to economize on the number and value of transactions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery versus Payment</td>
<td>A mechanism which ensures that the transfer of payment from a payment system occurs if and only if the delivery of securities from a securities system occurs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disposable Income</td>
<td>The remaining income after taxes has been paid which is available for spending and saving.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Conglomerates</td>
<td>Financial institutions under common ownership which undertake a wide range of activities such as banking, stock broking, insurance and fund management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Intermediation</td>
<td>The process of channelling funds between lenders and borrowers. Financial institutions, by transforming short-term deposits or savings into long-term lending or investments engage in the process of financial intermediation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Deficit</td>
<td>The excess of government expenditure over revenue for a given period of time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Exchange Risk</td>
<td>The risk of potential losses which arise from adverse movements in the exchange rate incurred by an institution holding foreign currency-denominated instruments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funds Under Management/ Managed Funds</td>
<td>The management of various forms of client investments by a financial institution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gap Ratio</td>
<td>The ratio of cumulative differences between interest bearing assets and liabilities over various time horizons (e.g. less than 1 year, 1-2 years) to total assets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedging</td>
<td>Strategy designed to reduce investment risk or financial risk. For example, taking positions that offset each other in case of market price movements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Margin</td>
<td>The dollar amount of interest earned on assets (interest income) minus the dollar amount of interest paid on liabilities (interest expense), expressed as a percent of total assets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Rate Risk</td>
<td>The risk associated with potential losses incurred on various financial instruments due to interest rate movements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intraday Credit</td>
<td>Credit extended to a payment system participant that is to be repaid within the same day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Value Transfer System</td>
<td>A payment system designated for the transfer of large value and time-critical funds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquid Ratio</td>
<td>The ratio of average prescribed assets to average prescribed liabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquidity Risk</td>
<td>The risk that a counterparty will be unable to settle payment of all obligations when due.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Open Position</td>
<td>The difference between long positions and short positions in various financial instruments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Performing Loans</td>
<td>Loans whose payments of interest and principal are past due by 90 days or more.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off-Balance Sheet Items</td>
<td>Contingent assets and debts that are not recorded on the balance sheet of a company. They are usually noteworthy as these items could significantly affect profitability if realized.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Payment System

A payment system consist of the mechanisms - including payment instruments, institutions, procedures, and technologies - used to communicate information from payer to payee to settle payment obligations.

Payment Versus Payment

A mechanism which ensures that the transfer of payment occurs if and only if the final transfer of a counterparty payment is simultaneously received.

Preferences shares

Capital stock which provides a specific dividend that is paid before any dividends are paid to common stock holders and which takes precedence over common stock in the event of liquidation.

Prescribed Liabilities

These refer to a) deposit liabilities, b) reservable borrowings and c) interest accrued and payable on a) and b).

Real-Time Gross Settlement System

A gross settlement system in which payment transfers are settled continuously on a transaction-by-transaction basis at the time they are received (that is, in real-time).

Repurchase Agreement (Repo)

A contract between a seller and a buyer whereby the seller agrees to repurchase securities sold at an agreed price and at a stated time. Repos are used as a vehicle for money market investments as well as a monetary policy instrument of BOJ.

Retail Payment System

An interbank payment system designated for small value payments including cheques, direct debits, credit transfers, ABM and POS transactions.

Stress Test

A quantitative test to determine the loss exposure of an institution using assumptions of abnormal but plausible shocks to market conditions.
Systemic Risk

The risk of insolvency of a participant or a group of participants in a system due to spillover effects from the failure of another participant to honour its payment obligations in a timely fashion.

Value at Risk (VAR)

A metric or statistical technique that seeks to estimate the loss that an institution will not exceed over a specified time period with a given probability.